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SOVEREIGNTY MISMATCH AND THE NEW 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
DAVID ZARING

 
ABSTRACT 
In the United States, making international policymaking work with 
domestic administrative law poses one of the thorniest of modern legal 
problems—the problem of sovereignty mismatch. Purely domestic 
regulation, which is a bureaucratic exercise of sovereignty, cannot solve 
the most challenging issues that regulators now face, and so agencies 
have started cooperating with their foreign counterparts, which is a 
negotiated form of sovereignty. But the way they cooperate threatens to 
undermine all of the values that domestic administrative law, especially its 
American variant, stands for. International and domestic regulation differ 
in almost every important way: procedural requirements, substantive 
remits, method of legitimation, and even in basic policy goals. Even worse, 
the delegation of power away from the United States is something that our 
constitutional, international, and administrative law traditions all look 
upon with great suspicion. The resulting effort to merge international and 
domestic regulatory styles has been uneven at best. As the globalization of 
policymaking is the likely future of environmental, business conduct, and 
consumer protection regulation—and the new paradigm-setting present of 
financial regulation—the sovereignty mismatch problem must be 
addressed; this Article shows how Congress can do so.  
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INTRODUCTION 
The worst financial crisis in a generation has inspired both domestic 
and international reform—reform that the heads of state and chief financial 
regulators of the world‘s largest economies think should work together. 
―[G]iven the high interdependence among our countries in the global 
economic and financial system,‖ the world‘s most important finance 
ministers have declared, ―[o]ur cooperation is essential.‖1  
The President appears to agree. Last year, he issued a new executive 
order directing his subordinates to pursue ―international regulatory 
cooperation‖ to ―meet[] shared challenges involving health, safety, labor, 
security, environmental, and other issues . . . .‖2 Regulation by cross-
border cooperation has become the priority, in short, both at home and 
abroad. 
But in the United States, making international policymaking work with 
domestic administrative law is extremely challenging.
3
 The two styles 
 
 
 1. The full text of this communiqué may be found at G-20, COMMUNIQUÉ: MEETING OF 
FINANCE MINISTERS AND CENTRAL BANK GOVERNORS (Oct. 23, 2010), available at http://www.g20 
.utoronto.ca/2010/g20finance101023.html. 
 2. Exec. Ord. No. 13,609 § 1, Promoting International Regulatory Cooperation, 77 Fed. Reg. 
26,413, 26,413 (May 1, 2012). 
 3. It remains, however, a building block of American financial policy. See Daniel Hemel, 
Regulatory Consolidation and Cross-Border Coordination: Challenging the Conventional Wisdom, 28 
YALE J. ON REG. 213, 215 (2011) (―Throughout the regulatory reform process, the Obama 
Administration has emphasized that its twin goals of domestic regulatory consolidation and cross-
border regulatory coordination are ‗consistent‘ with one another.‖). 
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differ in procedural requirements, substantive remits, methods of 
legitimation, and even basic policy goals.  
Moreover, their interplay is only proceeding over strenuous dissent. 
Justice Antonin Scalia has argued that, on constitutional grounds at least, 
the idea ―that American law should conform to the laws of the rest of the 
world ought to be rejected out of hand.‖4 Over two-thirds of Oklahoma 
voters voted to amend their state constitution to provide that ―[t]he courts 
shall not look to the legal precepts of other nations or cultures,‖ especially 
―international law or Sharia law.‖5 
And yet, international policymaking and domestic administrative law 
have increasingly, and—as this Article argues—inevitably, been charged 
with complementing one another in a very particular way. Across the 
regulatory spectrum, the formulation of policy is being done at the 
international level, under the auspices of negotiated arrangements among a 
confederacy of agencies, while execution of policy remains the province 
of domestic regulators. It is a change that is having significant but 
unresolved effects on domestic law. This Article will examine those 
effects, which are substantial enough to, it argues, require legitimation by 
the legislature—an International Administrative Procedure Act, if you 
like. 
The need for a congressional solution stems from the seriousness of the 
problem, as Justice Scalia and those Oklahoma voters have recognized, 
which is that the delegation of power away from the United States—the 
very definition of international regulatory cooperation—is something that 
our constitutional, international, and administrative law traditions all look 
upon with suspicion.
6
 It is a suspicion that has only been exacerbated by 
 
 
 4. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 624 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 5. OKLA. CONST. art. VII, § 1, cl. C. See OKLA. ST. ELECTION BD., SUMMARY RESULTS: 
GENERAL ELECTION (Nov. 2, 2010), available at http://www.ok.gov/elections/support/10gen.html 
(noting that Oklahoma State Question No. 755, Legislative Referendum No. 355, passed with 70.08 
percent voting in favor of the proposal). For a discussion of the Oklahoma ballot initiative, see 
generally Yaser Ali, Shariah and Citizenship—How Islamophobia Is Creating a Second-Class 
Citizenry in America, 100 CAL. L. REV. 1027 (2012). 
 6. Justice Scalia has been understood to posit that ―[f]oreign law isn‘t ours.‖ Mary Flood, Scalia 
Criticizes Courts Citing Foreign Trends, HOUSTON CHRON., Nov. 18, 2008, available at http://www 
.chron.com/news/houston-texas/article/Scalia-criticizes-courts-citing-foreign-trends-1766787.php. The 
courts, especially the D.C. Circuit, the nation‘s premier administrative law court, have frequently 
evinced a similar suspicion. See, e.g., Natural Res. Def. Council v. EPA, 464 F.3d 1, 8 (D.C. Cir. 
2006) (―If the ‗decisions‘ [of an international organization, in this case the implementing body of the 
Montreal Protocol designed to combat depletion of the ozone layer,] are ‗law‘—enforceable in federal 
court like statutes or legislative rules—then Congress either has delegated lawmaking authority to an 
international body or authorized amendments to a treaty without presidential signature or Senate 
ratification, in violation of Article II of the Constitution.‖); Defenders of Wildlife v. Gutierrez, 532 
F.3d 913, 927 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (―[I]f the Coast Guard had delegated some or all of its decisionmaking 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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the Supreme Court‘s recent, and controversial, willingness to entertain 
foreign precedents as guidance for domestic constitutional interpretation.
7
 
The effort to merge the international and domestic regulatory styles 
represents what I call the sovereignty mismatch problem in modern 
administration. Sovereignty mismatch is a way of characterizing the 
fundamental challenge to the growing internationalization of domestic 
administrative law, putting a negotiated cross-border process, where 
sovereignty is exercised by dealmaking, on top of a routinized and 
regulated domestic one, where sovereignty is exercised by rulemaking.
8
 
As the globalization of policymaking is already the new paradigm-setting 
reality of financial regulation, and is the future of environmental, business 
conduct, and consumer protection regulation, the sovereignty mismatch 
problem must be addressed.
9
  
But addressing it is very difficult. While domestic regulation must 
follow the rules of ordinary administrative law, the emerging new form of 
 
 
authority under the Ports and Waterways Safety Act to an outside body not subordinate to it, such as 
the International Maritime Organization, the delegation would be unlawful . . . .‖). See also John O. 
McGinnis, Medellín and the Future of International Delegation, 118 YALE L.J. 1712, 1720–25 (2009) 
(comparing the problems of international cooperation with the growth of the administrative state). 
 7. See, e.g., Roper, 543 U.S. at 577 (2005) (―The United Kingdom‘s experience bears particular 
relevance here . . . . [It] has abolished the death penalty in its entirety; but, decades before it took this 
step, it recognized the disproportionate nature of the juvenile death penalty; and it abolished that 
penalty as a separate matter.‖); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 572 (2003) (―The sweeping 
references by Chief Justice Burger to the history of Western civilization and to Judeo‐Christian moral 
and ethical standards did not take account of other authorities pointing in an opposite direction.‖); 
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 317 n.21 (2002) (―[W]ithin the world community, the imposition of 
the death penalty for crimes committed by mentally retarded offenders is overwhelmingly 
disapproved.‖). Scholars, on the other hand, have supported this turn. Bruce Ackerman, for example, 
has advocated ―world constitutionalism.‖ See Bruce Ackerman, The Rise of World Constitutionalism, 
83 VA. L. REV. 771 (1997) (supporting the examination of foreign sources to give content to domestic 
constitutional rights). See also David S. Law, Generic Constitutional Law, 89 MINN. L. REV. 652 
(2005) (comparing various constitutional provisions). 
 8. See infra notes 42–47 and accompanying text (discussing the Kyoto Protocol, an 
international treaty to decrease CO2 omissions by country, and the political and legal difficulties China 
and the U.S. face in implementing the treaty‘s mandate). 
 9. As Edward Swaine has observed, ―Despite its continuing mistrust of international 
engagements, the United States continues to vest new authority in established organizations . . . and to 
create new institutions . . . that exercise considerable power over U.S. affairs. The march seems 
inexorable.‖ Edward T. Swaine, The Constitutionality of International Delegations, 104 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1492, 1495 (2004) (footnote omitted). See also Curtis A. Bradley, International Delegations, the 
Structural Constitution, and Non-Self-Execution, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1557, 1560–61 (2003) (analyzing 
the constitutionality of treaty delegations to international bodies and suggesting that those delegations 
would violate separation of powers principles); David Golove, The New Confederalism: Treaty 
Delegations of Legislative, Executive, and Judicial Authority, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1697, 1701 (2003) 
(arguing that ―[t]he Founders were neither committed to a principle of exclusive national democracy 
nor were they opposed in principle to treaty-based delegations of governmental authority to 
international bodies, including delegations‖). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol91/iss1/2
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global regulation, where agencies cooperate with one another on basic 
policy approaches, is—and again, this is the mismatch—negotiated and 
informal, and so lacks procedural safeguards.  
There is, for example, no judicial review on the international level, and 
only voluntarily offered administrative process. Judicial review is a 
paradigmatic feature of domestic administrative law, as are requirements 
such as publication in the Federal Register, concise statements of the basis 
for rules, and—at least as a matter of practice, if not one of formal 
doctrine—increasingly elaborate responses to comment.10 International 
rulemaking dispenses with these requirements. 
And therein lies a problem. Under American law, the fact that the 
international role is the prescriptive one implicates the nondelegation and 
delegation doctrines, due process concerns, Appointments Clause 
problems, and basic questions about whether notice and comment 
requirements are met if the important policymaking was done at the 
international level.
11
  
Americans have particular reason to be worried about these 
developments. In a number of different contexts, the international 
delegation of policymaking authority has resulted in policy formulation 
that the United States has either traditionally opposed or carefully debated: 
 America‘s global warming policy, rather than being expressed by 
commitment to a treaty like the Kyoto Protocol, is increasingly 
being set through informal comparisons with Chinese emission 
levels.
12
 ―The reality,‖ then-Senator John Kerry (D-MA) has 
said, ―is that a robust American partnership with China will do 
more than anything else to ensure a successful global response to 
the urgent threat of climate change.‖13 
 
 
 10. For a black letter discussion of these requirements, the customary reference works are 
Richard J. Pierce, Jr.‘s three-volume ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE (4th ed. 2002) (revising 
Kenneth Culp Davis‘ earlier editions), and the ABA‘s rulemaking overview, JEFFREY S. LUBBERS, A 
GUIDE TO FEDERAL AGENCY RULEMAKING 160–79 (4th ed. 2006) (setting forth the basic reviewability 
requirements). 
 11. Cf. Barbara Koremenos, When, What, and Why Do States Choose to Delegate, 71 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 151, 168–69 (2008) (describing the reasons why states might look to international 
cooperation to solve their regulatory problems). 
 12. See infra notes 42–47 and accompanying text. As Jonathan Nash has observed, ―[t]here has 
also been much public debate on a second issue—whether, even if global warming is validly a matter 
of world concern, the United States should act to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions when other 
countries do not.‖ Jonathan Remy Nash, Standing and the Precautionary Principle, 108 COLUM. L. 
REV. 494, 507 n.62 (2008). 
 13. Challenges and Opportunities for U.S.-China Cooperation on Climate Change: Hearing 
Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 111th Cong. 1 (2009) (statement of Sen. John Kerry, 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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 American competition policy, with its traditional focus on 
consumer (and only consumer) protection, is under increasing 
pressure to be modified to comport with a more European 
standard that balances consumer interests with those of other 
interested parties.
14
  
 Although both President Obama and the Chairman of the Federal 
Reserve, Ben Bernanke, have made noises about engaging in 
stricter executive compensation regulation,
15
 the United States 
has traditionally taken a laissez-faire attitude towards the pay 
packages that companies offer their employees.
16
 But the 
transnational Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (―Basel 
Committee‖) has instructed its member agencies,17 including the 
Federal Reserve Board (―the Fed‖), to adopt a laundry list of new 
tools to scrutinize executive pay.
18
 
 
 
Chairman, S. Comm. on Foreign Relations). For an analysis of the issue, see John Copeland Nagle, 
How Much Should China Pollute?, 12 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 591 (2011). 
 14. These other interested parties include, most notably, competitors of firms engaged in 
allegedly anti-competitive conduct or pursuing anti-competitive acquisitions. See infra notes 48–53 
and accompanying text. 
 15. See, e.g., Bernanke: Executive Pay Must Be Monitored, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Mar. 20, 2009, 
1:55 PM), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/29792546/ns/business-stocks_and_economy/t/bernanke-exe 
cutive-pay-must-be-monitored/#.TuETrGMk6so; Jonathan Weisman & Joann S. Lublin, Obama Lays 
Out Limits on Executive Pay, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 5, 2009, 11:59 PM), http://online.wsj.com/article/ 
SB123375514020647787.html (laying out plans to restrict executive compensation for the seven firms 
that received large bailouts during the financial crisis). 
 16. Randall S. Thomas, Explaining the International CEO Pay Gap: Board Capture or Market 
Driven?, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1171, 1182–83 (2004) (―When it comes to compensation, American 
executives stand out as exceptional on an international basis and U.S. chief executive officers have 
particularly distinctive arrangements. . . . [One survey shows that total annual remuneration for U.S. 
CEOs] was more than twice the average pay for CEOs in all of the other 25 countries surveyed, and 
. . . more than three times the average CEO pay in all but seven countries (Argentina, Brazil, Canada, 
China/Hong Kong, Mexico, Singapore and the United Kingdom).‖) (footnote omitted). 
 17. These member agencies include the banking regulators of the G20. See BASEL COMM. ON 
BANKING SUPERVISION, HISTORY OF THE BASEL COMMITTEE AND ITS MEMBERSHIP (Aug. 2009), 
available at http://www.bis.org/bcbs/history.pdf. 
 18. See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, Paying For Long-Term Performance, 158 U. PA. 
L. REV. 1915, 1918 (2010) (―At the international level, the Basel II framework has been recently 
amended to require banking regulators to monitor compensation structures with a view to aligning 
them with good risk management.‖). This has been supported by a declaration encouraging such 
oversight by the G20 as well. See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Holger Spamann, Regulating Bankers‟ Pay, 
98 GEO. L.J. 247, 250 (2010) (―[I]n their recent September 2009 meeting, the G20 leaders ‗committed 
to act together to . . . implement strong international compensation standards aimed at ending practices 
that lead to excessive risk-taking . . . .‘‖) (quoting G-20, LEADERS‘ STATEMENT: THE PITTSBURGH 
SUMMIT 2 (2008), available at http://ec.europa.eu/commission_2010-2014/president/pdf/statement_ 
20090826_en_2.pdf)). 
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 The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection 
Act (―Dodd-Frank‖),19 designed to be the centerpiece of reform 
of the American financial system, requires bank regulators to 
develop alternatives to the use of credit ratings in evaluating the 
quality of bank reserve assets.
20
 But such alternatives are difficult 
to reconcile with the Basel Committee‘s commitment to credit 
ratings of capital reserves.
21
 As the white shoe law firm, Sullivan 
& Cromwell, has observed in a client memo, ―two documents . . . 
issued by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision . . . make 
extensive use of credit ratings, and thus raise issues under Dodd-
Frank.‖22 
 After the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
rejected an effort to harmonize accounting standards across 
jurisdictions in the 1990s, a European-based network of 
accountants, with the support of the continent‘s capital market 
regulators, devised the International Financial Reporting 
Standards (IFRS) that have since been adopted by almost every 
jurisdiction in the world.
23
 IFRS is a principles-based method of 
 
 
 19. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 
Stat. 1376 (2010). 
 20. For an overview of the issue, see Melvyn Westlake, Dodd-Frank Bar on Ratings Hinders 
Basel III Adoption, 9 GLOBAL RISK REGULATOR (Jan. 2011), available at http://www.globalrisk 
regulator.com/ article.php?pgkey=2483. 
 21. For the Committee‘s continued reliance on credit ratings, see BASEL COMMITTEE ON 
BANKING SUPERVISION, BASEL III: THE LIQUIDITY COVERAGE RATIO AND LIQUIDITY RISK 
MONITORING TOOLS (2013), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs238.pdf. For commentary, see 
also Felix Salmon, Dodd-Frank vs Basel III, REUTERS (Jan. 20, 2011), http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-
salmon/2011/01/20/dodd-frank-vs-basel-iii/. 
 22. SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP, RISK-BASED BANK CAPITAL GUIDELINES (Aug. 31, 2010), 
available at http://www.sullcrom.com/Risk-Based-Bank-Capital-Guidelines-08-31-2010/. See also 
Sullivan & Cromwell on What‟s Next for Credit Ratings, SEC. LAW PRACTICE CENTER, (Sept. 13, 
2010, 4:19 PM), http://seclawcenter.pli.edu/2010/09/13/sullivan-cromwell-on-whats-next-for-credit-
ratings/. 
 23. Tyler Weigel, Comment, A New Universal Language?: An Overview of Adopting the 
International Financial Reporting Standards in the United States, 80 UMKC L. REV. 1239, 1239 
(2012) (―The majority of the world-approximately 120 countries-currently use IFRS when preparing 
corporate financial statements.‖). For more discussion, see William W. Bratton, Heedless Globalism: 
The SEC‟s Roadmap to Accounting Convergence, 79 U. CIN. L. REV. 471, 474 (2010) (―Ironically, a 
switch to IFRS would also allow management to reclaim some of the lost territory while 
simultaneously enhancing rents collected by its auditors.‖); Lawrence A. Cunningham, The SEC‟s 
Global Accounting Vision: A Realistic Appraisal of a Quixotic Quest, 87 N.C. L. REV. 1, 3 (2008) 
(noting the ―revolutionary‖ nature of ―the [SEC]‘s willingness to jettison rules requiring companies to 
apply recognized U.S. accounting standards by inviting use of a new set of international standards 
created by a private London-based organization‖). For a history of the International Accounting 
Standards Board, told from the perspective of a former SEC Commissioner, see Roberta S. Karmel & 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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accounting, differing strikingly from the American, rules-
oriented Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP).
24
 
The SEC has grudgingly planned to permit companies to file 
their returns using the non-GAAP rules beginning in 2014, 
despite having played almost no role in devising the rules.
25
 
Climate change, financial regulation, and antitrust are American 
regulatory obsessions, but they are by no means exclusive examples of the 
growth of regulatory globalization.
26
 As problems globalize, policymakers 
 
 
Claire R. Kelly, The Hardening of Soft Law in Securities Regulation, 34 BROOK. J. INT‘L L. 883, 901–
03 (2009). 
 24. See, e.g., Lance J. Phillips, Note, The Implications of IFRS on the Functioning of the 
Securities Antifraud Regime in the United States, 108 MICH. L. REV. 603, 608 (2010) (arguing that 
―the principles-based approach of IFRS, which provides companies with increased flexibility in 
financial reporting, will threaten the current level of success enjoyed by plaintiffs bringing claims 
under the various federal securities antifraud laws‖). 
 25. Accounting Rules: The New Convergence Workplan is Looking Challenged, LEX FIN. TIMES 
(June 28, 2010, 8:35 AM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/4b92173e-8214-11df-938f-00144feabdc0 
,Authorised=false.html (―It was thought that the financial crisis would make convergence of 
accounting standards easier. After all, Lehman Brothers‘ infamous Repo 105 transactions, which 
boosted the failed bank‘s balance sheet, were permitted in the US but would have been disallowed 
under international standards. Ironically, one of the main areas of disagreement preventing the 
convergence of standards concerns one of the rules most instrumental in the crisis: mark to market, 
whereby assets and liabilities are valued at market prices.‖). The dispute between the American and 
foreign ways of accounting continues. See, e.g., Tammy Whitehouse, FASB, IASB Part Ways on 
Netting Derivatives, COMPLIANCE WEEK (June 21, 2011), available at http://www.complianceweek 
.com/fasb-iasb-part-ways-on-netting-derivatives/article/205748 (noting disparate standards for ―netting‖ 
derivatives on the balance sheet). 
 26. For other examples, see Margaret M. Blair et al., The New Role for Assurance Services in 
Global Commerce, 33 J. CORP. L. 325, 358 (2008) (―[T]he role played by third party assurance may be 
a merging of private law contractual mechanisms for organizing production with public law activities 
of standard setting and enforcement.‖); Daniel C. Esty, Good Governance at the Supranational Scale: 
Globalizing Administrative Law, 115 YALE L.J. 1490, 1542 (2006) (discussing the ―policymaking 
practices of organizations working in three supranational realms: international trade, global public 
health, and environmental protection‖); Robert Howse, The End of the Globalization Debate: A 
Review Essay, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1528, 1548 (2008) (book review) (―The state‘s loss of its 
architectonic role and the corresponding multiplication of ‗partial, specialized, and applied normative 
orders‘ create the challenge of realizing the values of rule of law and democracy in contexts removed 
from the classic institutional structure of the state: a unified judicial system, formal representative 
institutions, and so on.‖); Andrew Lang & Joanne Scott, The Hidden World of WTO Governance, 20 
EUR. J. INT‘L L. 575, 576 (2009) (The WTO‘s committee system, it seems, ―apparently operate[s] on 
the basis of premises which are quite different from those which characterize formal dispute 
settlement. Indeed, [the committees] seemed to reveal a picture of the WTO which is at least 
potentially more dynamic, more cooperative, more reflexive, and more regulatory re-enforcing than is 
nearly always thought to be the case, based exclusively upon an examination of the dynamics of 
multilateral trade negotiations and dispute settlement.‖); Mario Savino, Global Administrative Law 
Meets “Soft” Powers: The Uncomfortable Case of Interpol Red Notices, 43 N.Y.U. J. INT‘L L. & POL. 
263, 264 (2011) (―Despite its growing importance, Interpol is still structured in many respects as an 
informal network of national officials. It is established outside an intergovernmental convention. Part 
of its activities are informal and based on non-binding rules. The fundamental principle is voluntary 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol91/iss1/2
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must respond, and that response will have distributional consequences—
winners and losers in the developed and developing worlds—in addition to 
substantive effects.
27
 But in considering any response, large problems of 
legality remain unaddressed, let alone resolved.  
What is to be done?
28
 There is a way to begin to resolve the 
sovereignty mismatch problem and to make regulatory globalization legal 
and responsive—not a perfect way, but a tested one. Paired with sensible 
legislation, it might just legitimize an only questionably legitimate, but 
absolutely necessary, phenomenon.  
The way forward begins with recognizing financial regulation‘s early 
steps toward solving the sovereignty mismatch problem.
29
 That form of 
international regulatory cooperation—as the most advanced of these global 
regulatory enterprises, and probably the most important of them—
illustrates some principles of decent regulatory design and some pretty 
good workarounds for doctrinal problems posed by the mismatch between 
the styles of sovereignty. It also illustrates, less fortunately, some of the 
rights that we are likely to give up to regulatory globalization. 
In the aftermath of the financial crisis, financial regulation has been 
transformed from a technocratic enterprise into something more 
coordinated, and with a larger degree of political oversight. It offers 
process at the bottom of the international framework, with regulatory 
policymaking being done more openly. And it offers some legitimacy at 
the top, given the enhanced roles played by the politicos of the G20, an 
informal grouping of large-economy heads of state and finance ministers. 
In addition, of course, it offers the fallback of domestic administrative 
 
 
participation and cooperation of its members. Judicial review is absent and political control is, at best, 
quiescent.‖). 
 27. However, it is not yet clear how, precisely, those distributional consequences will play out. 
For some views on this issue, see, e.g., Anu Bradford, The Brussels Effect, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 5 
(2012) (“unilateral regulatory globalization explains why the EU has become the predominant 
regulator of global commerce‖); B.S. Chimni, Co-Option and Resistance: Two Faces of Global 
Administrative Law, 37 N.Y.U. J. INT‘L L. & POL. 799, 800 (2005) (―By focusing exclusively on 
[regulatory globalization], a false impression may arise that existing international institutions are 
becoming more participatory and responsive to the concerns of developing countries and their 
peoples.‖); Jonathan R. Macey, Regulatory Globalization As A Response to Regulatory Competition, 
52 EMORY L.J. 1353, 1353 (2003) (―the trend toward regulatory globalization reflects a basic survival 
response on the part of bureaucrats whose regulatory power is threatened by increased competition and 
private-sector globalization‖). 
 28. Vladimir Ilyich Lenin wrote What Is to Be Done? in 1901, one of a series of tracts by Russian 
intellectuals and politicians with that title. 
 29. See infra Part III.A (discussing international financial regulators‘ move towards organizing 
themselves similarly to a domestic agency, with political oversight at the top, a watchdog group in the 
middle, and policymaking by expert groups below that). 
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process to those aggrieved by the policies set internationally–even if it 
does so a little late in the game.  
That is good, but it is not good enough. Congress can solve some of the 
delegation and due process problems of the sovereignty mismatch by 
broadly authorizing international regulatory cooperation, but conditioning 
that authorization on procedural protections. American agencies should go 
forth into a globalized world, but only if they do so through a process that 
notices international policymaking, receives comment on that notice, 
considers it, and publicizes the entire process on the Internet. There should 
be no mystery about what is being done on the international level, and no 
ambiguity about whether domestic authorization to act across borders has 
been given. 
In what follows, I describe the impulses that have generated the 
sovereignty mismatch, the legal and democratic challenges created by 
those impulses, and sketch the emerging efforts to address them. Part I 
lays the groundwork by examining the impetuses towards regulatory 
cooperation—it is cheap, regulators like it (for self-interested reasons), and 
once it starts, it is often hard to stop.  
Part II, the heart of the Article, addresses the sovereignty mismatch 
problem itself, and the serious legal questions it poses for the domestic 
implementation of a policy designed outside American borders. Because 
the sovereignty mismatch problem poses procedural, delegation, 
Appointments Clause, and due process challenges to American regulators, 
some time is spent considering each of these problems.  
Part III looks for a solution to the sovereignty mismatch problem by 
examining the way that financial regulatory globalization has muddled 
through its serious legal problems. Global financial regulation has tried to 
embrace the spirit of administrative good governance, even as it cannot 
hope to measure up to every legal punctilio of American governance 
requirements.  
Is spirit alone enough? Part IV acknowledges that American judges 
may need to make their peace with regulatory globalization—it does, after 
all, address critical problems—but also argues that some targeted hard law 
from Congress would do an even better job of solving the sovereignty 
mismatch problem. 
I. THE PROBLEM AS PROMISE 
Part I of this Article explains why regulatory globalization has been 
such an attractive recourse to the problems posed by an increasingly 
interconnected world, which in turn underscores the seriousness of the 
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2013] SOVEREIGNTY MISMATCH 69 
 
 
 
 
sovereignty mismatch problem. This Part establishes that policymaking is 
globalizing apace, offers examples of that globalization, and identifies 
some of the dynamics that foster regulatory globalization.  
Three related fundamentals underlie the regulatory turn to the 
international. First, international regulatory cooperation is a comparatively 
easy response to globalization. Second, it is preferred by regulators, 
who—at least so far—have found it to be a technocratic exercise 
consistent with their own preferences. Third, it has generated a momentum 
in many cases that encourages politicians, regulators, and citizens to 
commit to it. The result is that governance is now, in so many areas, an 
international project.
30
 It crosses borders as people, businesses, and 
regulatory problems increasingly do the same.
31
 And the recent economic 
cataclysms in the United States
32
 and Europe,
33
 as well as the responses to 
them, only illustrate that interconnectedness. 
Cross-border regulatory cooperation is, of course, not a bad thing for 
lots of reasons, and it is increasingly difficult to imagine a world without 
it. Global cooperation is promising; it may even be inevitable. But as the 
governance response to problems crosses borders, the rules about 
governance have not, creating the problems that I will analyze further in 
Part II. This Part of the Article explores that critical initial step—the case 
for the turn abroad. 
A. Regulatory Cooperation Costs Little 
International cooperation is often essential, but the alternatives to the 
regulatory turn are difficult. Kal Raustiala is one of a number of observers 
 
 
 30. This international governance reaches domestic courts and domestic agencies. See Julian G. 
Ku, International Delegations and the New World Court Order, 81 WASH. L. REV. 1, 4 (2006) 
(―Litigants are increasingly asking U.S. courts to enforce judgments by international tribunals and 
courts.‖). But see Andrew T. Guzman & Jennifer Landsidle, The Myth of International Delegation, 96 
CALIF. L. REV. 1693, 1695 (2008) (―In reality, examples of non-trivial international delegations are 
quite rare.‖). For a discussion of these opposing views, see Note, International Delegation As 
Ordinary Delegation, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1042 (2012). 
 31. Indeed, the ―failure to permit international delegations could leave the United States (and 
potentially the world) helpless to address pressing global problems.‖ Note, supra note 30, at 1043.  
 32. For a discussion of the financial crisis, and the regulatory response to it, see Steven M. 
Davidoff & David Zaring, Regulation by Deal: The Government‟s Response to the Financial Crisis, 
61 ADMIN. L. REV. 463 (2009). 
 33. The European sovereign debt crisis has already generated a good popular history from 
MICHAEL LEWIS, BOOMERANG: TRAVELS IN THE NEW THIRD WORLD (2011), and fascinating legal 
accounts from Anna Gelpern, Bankruptcy, Backwards: The Problem of Quasi-Sovereign Debt, 121 
YALE L.J. 888, 930–31 (2012), and Lee C. Buchheit & G. Mitu Gulati, Greek Debt—The Endgame 
Scenarios (Apr. 18, 2011) (unpublished working paper), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract= 
1807011. 
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who has suggested that states turn to regulatory cooperation where the 
transaction costs of alternative legal approaches, such as treaties, are 
high.
34
 And the costs of those alternatives grow ever higher. As Jacob 
Cogan has shown, formal treaty conclusion has become a rather 
demanding exercise: ―[w]hereas once international law substantially 
deferred to states in the enactment and implementation of individual 
duties, it now specifies those duties more and more, and leaves less and 
less room for state discretion.‖35  
Treaties take time and energy to conclude, are difficult, especially in 
the United States, to ratify, and have become quite directive and specific. 
In light of their costs, it is perhaps unsurprising that regulators have cast 
around for alternatives. They have found an attractive one in ―going it 
alone,‖ without the guiding hand of diplomats or politicians (or without 
much of it, at least). Cross-border regulatory cooperation has reached 
deeply into quite partisan American policy, without involving the parties 
and officials thought to be most engaged in partisanship. 
Consider two examples of this phenomenon: America‘s settlement with 
Europe on data privacy, and America‘s inclination to parallel its response 
to global warming with that of China. Both illustrate the attractively low 
costs of regulatory cooperation compared to alternative forms of 
governance while also illustrating that regulatory globalization can remove 
matters from domestic participation. 
Data privacy protections regulate the ability of companies and 
governments to use the personal information—ranging from credit card 
purchases to browsing history to passenger lists—collected and processed 
by industry and government.
36
 Europe has always protected the privacy of 
this data, and restricted the abilities of firms to use it, more than has the 
United States: the United States has no independent regulatory authority 
charged with monitoring privacy and has never promulgated 
comprehensive data privacy regulations for the private sector.
37
  
 
 
 34. Kal Raustiala, The Architecture of International Cooperation: Transgovernmental Networks 
and the Future of International Law, 43 VA. J. INT‘L L. 1 (2002). 
 35. Jacob Katz Cogan, The Regulatory Turn in International Law, 52 HARV. INT‘L L.J. 321, 370 
(2011). 
 36. As Daniel Solove has put it, rather pessimistically,  
[d]atabases alter the way the bureaucratic process makes decisions and judgments affecting 
our lives; and they exacerbate and transform existing imbalances in power within our 
relationships with bureaucratic institutions. This is the central dimension of the database 
privacy problem, and it is best understood with the [metaphor of Franz Kafka‘s The Trial]. 
Daniel J. Solove, Privacy and Power: Computer Databases and Metaphors for Information Privacy, 
53 STAN. L. REV. 1393, 1399 (2001). 
 37. See ABRAHAM NEWMAN, TRANSATLANTIC COOPERATION AND CONFLICT OVER DATA 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol91/iss1/2
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Europe‘s privacy rights, by contrast, were written into its Lisbon Treaty 
and expressed through a privacy directive on data protection that has been 
in effect since 1998.
38
 The directive offers substantially more protection of 
consumer data than does the United States, most notably through its opt-in 
provisions regarding the disclosure of information, which requires explicit 
consent by consumers before the information may be disclosed.
39
  
Accordingly, reconciling European and US rules on data protection has 
proven very difficult, but crucial in an age where big companies do 
business in both jurisdictions. And so reconciliation was pursued, not by 
treaty, but by regulatory cooperation. 
The United States Department of Commerce, in consultation with 
European data protection regulators, has developed a ―safe harbor‖ 
framework. This framework allows firms like Google, that have collected 
data on European citizens, to commit to a level of data protection that is 
otherwise unrequired by American law, but that the European Union is 
willing to permit as a substitute for its own efforts.
40
  
 
 
PRIVACY RULES: LESSONS FOR INTERNATIONAL MARKET REGULATION (2007), available at 
http://www.gmfus.org/archives/transatlantic-cooperation-and-conflict-over-privacy-rules-lessons-for-
international-market-regulation/. For a discussion of the American approach to data privacy, see Paul 
M. Schwartz & Daniel J. Solove, The PII Problem: Privacy and a New Concept of Personally 
Identifiable Information, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1814, 1816 (2011) (―Information privacy law rests on the 
currently unstable category of Personally Identifiable Information . . . .‖). 
 38. [T]he evolution of privacy as a fundamental right is reflected for the EU member 
states 
in the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty and the Charter of Fundamental Rights, which added the 
protection of individuals‘ fundamental rights and freedom with regard to the processing of 
personal data (‗data protection‘) as a fundamental right. 
Marc Rotenberg & David Jacobs, Updating the Law of Information Privacy: The New Framework of 
the European Union, 36 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL‘Y 605, 608 (2013). See Directive 95/46/EC, of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the Protection of Individuals with 
Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 
31, available at http://www.ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/95-46-ce/dir1995-46_part1_en 
.pdf. For a discussion, see Gregory Shaffer, Globalization and Social Protection: The Impact of EU 
and International Rules in the Ratcheting Up of U.S. Privacy Standards, 25 YALE J. INT‘L L. 1, 2–3 
(2000). 
 39. For an analysis of the welter of European data privacy regulation, see Lothar Determann & 
Robert Sprague, Intrusive Monitoring: Employee Privacy Expectations Are Reasonable in Europe, 
Destroyed in the United States, 26 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 979, 1018–31 (2011). 
 40. As the Department of Commerce has explained, ―[i]n order to bridge these [different privacy 
approaches] and provide a streamlined means for U.S. organizations to comply with the [European 
Data Protection] Directive, the U.S. Department of Commerce in consultation with the European 
Commission developed a ‗Safe Harbor‘ framework and this website to provide the information an 
organization would need to evaluate—and then join—the U.S.-EU Safe Harbor program.‖ Main Safe 
Harbor Homepage, EXPORT.GOV, http://export.gov/safeharbor (last visited Oct. 9, 2013). For more 
analysis, see Chuan Sun, The European Union Privacy Directive and its Impact on the U.S. Privacy 
Protection Policy: A Year 2003 Perspective, 2 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 99 (2003). Or, as one 
regulator has put it, ―We were looking for a political green light, but have to defer to the institutional 
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This regulatory arrangement has meant that American companies are 
forced to follow much more stringent data privacy protection 
arrangements than those required by American law. But what is the 
alternative? As Graham Greenleaf has observed, a UN data privacy treaty 
―from scratch is unrealistic.‖41  
As for global warming, while most countries have committed to the 
Kyoto Protocol, a treaty limiting global CO2 emissions, the United States 
and China, the two largest emitters in the world, have been unable to 
muster the political will to join them.
42
 The US, for one, is a signatory to 
the treaty without intention to ratify, while China is categorized as a 
developing country not subject to binding CO2 emission targets; it has 
steadfastly resisted any effort to adopt more developed country types of 
emissions controls.
43
 For the United States, as we will see, the problem is 
also a legal one. The protocol creates a carbon market overseen by an 
executive board, which is capable of revising the emission limits with 
which the members of the protocol must comply;
44
 that delegation to a 
 
 
demands of the EU.‖ Ayla Jean Yackley, Safe Harbor Vote Delayed, WIRED (Apr. 17, 2000), 
http://www.wired.com/politics/law/news/2000/04/35406. 
 41. Graham Greenleaf, Powerpoint from SCRIPT Seminar, Edinburgh: The Global Trajectory of 
Data Privacy Laws (Dec. 8, 2011), http://www2.austlii.edu.au/~graham/publications/2011/SCRIPT 
_trajectory_1211PPT.pdf. But see Ariel E. Wade, Note, A New Age of Privacy Protection: A Proposal 
for an International Personal Data Privacy Treaty, 42 GEO. WASH. INT‘L L. REV. 659, 660 (2010) 
(―[M]odern society needs an International Personal Data Privacy Treaty to secure privacy on a world-
wide basis.‖). 
 42. Indeed, the United States has considered unsigning the Kyoto Protocol. See generally 
Edward T. Swaine, Unsigning, 55 STAN. L. REV. 2061, 2063 (2003) (―International lawyers also 
regarded the mere act of unsigning [the treaty establishing the International Criminal Court] as 
significant in itself.‖). The Clinton Administration promised to put Kyoto to ratification before the 
Senate, and the Bush Administration that followed it ended those plans. See Jonathan B. Wiener, 
Whose Precaution After All? A Comment on the Comparison and Evolution of Risk Regulatory 
Systems, 13 DUKE J. COMP. & INT‘L L., Summer 2003, at 207, 210 (―As to climate change, President 
Clinton signed the Kyoto Protocol but would not submit it to the U.S. Senate for ratification, and 
President Bush later withdrew from the Kyoto negotiations entirely.‖).  
 Part of the problem with the Kyoto Protocol from an American perspective was not just political 
but touched on the legal delegation that might be made under Kyoto. For a more general discussion of 
China-US relations and climate change, see Michael P. Vandenbergh, Climate Change: The China 
Problem, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 905, 908 n.11 (2008) (―China and the United States, the two largest 
emitters, not only have declined to commit to reductions but have attempted to undermine the efforts 
of other governments to date.‖). 
 43. Deepa Badrinarayana, The Kyoto Protocol’s Emissions Trading Scheme: Realistic or Unjust 
Solution for Potential Developing Nation Signatories?, 42 ENVTL. L. REP. 11,157, 11,157 (2012) 
(noting the fact that developing countries, including China, are not subject to binding emissions 
reductions obligations under the Kyoto Protocol); Liana G.T. Wolf, Countervailing A Hidden Subsidy: 
The U.S. Failure to Require Greenhouse Gas Emission Reductions, 19 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 83, 
88 (2006) (mentioning the United States’ signing of the Protocol in 1998 and subsequent withdrawal 
from participation in 2001). 
 44. For an overview of the regulatory implications of the mechanism set up under the Protocol, 
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freestanding multinational body given the power to change American law 
raises particular fears over the separation of powers. Daniel Abebe and 
Jonathan Masur have concluded that the Chinese central government may 
be in a similarly hands-tied situation with respect to implementing and 
enforcing climate change rules in the People‘s Republic.45  
Rather than joining Kyoto, or attempting to conclude another treaty to 
deal with global warming, American global warming policy appears to 
have shifted away from the project of formal international legal obligation 
and toward a regulatory approach to limiting emissions. This regime might 
be thought of as a wink-and-nudge non-binding comparative 
commitment.
46
 American rules reducing greenhouse gas emissions appear 
to be contingent, at least in degree, to commitments by the other major 
emitters, especially China, to do the same.
47
  
Negotiating climate change priorities with the Chinese, or data privacy 
with the Europeans, sounds quite cosmopolitan. But it has costs as well. 
Issues deeply important to many Americans, as well as citizens of other 
countries, have been taken out of the sphere of lawmaking and put in the 
sphere of regulatory cooperation and parallelism, or, at least, increasingly 
appear to be moving toward that sphere. There is a potentially alarming 
ease to this change. As it turns out, regulatory cooperation simply costs 
less than do treaties.  
 
 
see Charlotte Streck and Jolene Lin, Making Markets Work: A Review of CDM Performance and the 
Need for Reform, 19 EUR. J. INT‘L L. 409 (2008). These sorts of international delegations can be 
problematic.  
 45. Daniel Abebe & Jonathan S. Masur, International Agreements, Internal Heterogeneity, and 
Climate Change: The “Two Chinas” Problem, 50 VA. J. INT‘L L. 325 (2010) (characterizing China‘s 
reluctance to join the Kyoto Protocol as ―directly related to its internal political, economic, and social 
dynamics,‖ including uneven growth and income disparity between the East and West sides of China 
which might be further exacerbated by agreeing to limit CO2 emissions). 
 46. As one scholar has observed, ―[t]he United States and China may have greater success than 
the global community as a whole in identifying an agreement that is acceptable to them.‖ Nagle, supra 
note 13, at 632; see also BRUCE AU ET AL., BEYOND A GLOBAL DEAL: A UN+ APPROACH TO CLIMATE 
GOVERNANCE, GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 2020 26 (2011), available at http://www.gg2020.net/fileadmin/ 
media/gg2020/GG2020_2011_Climate_Beyond_Global_Deal.pdf.pdf (―China‘s decisions, along with 
those of the United States, will largely determine the shape of global climate institutions in the post-
Kyoto era.‖). 
 47. As one American negotiator observed after the failed Cancun negotiations on climate change, 
the likelihood that the largest creators of greenhouse gases will be willing to sign a treaty reducing 
emissions is unlikely, even though the largest of those emitters, the United States and China, might be 
willing to consider less formal alternatives. See Video: Jonathan Pershing, What Happened in Cancun 
and Where Do the Climate Negotiations Go from Here? (Center for Strategic and Int‘l Studies Jan. 5, 
2011), available at http://csis.org/event/post-cancun-update (begin at 23:30). 
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B. Regulators Like Regulatory Cooperation 
A second, and not entirely unrelated, reason to think that regulation 
across borders will grow—and grow rapidly—turns on the relationships 
among regulators. Those relationships have been easier to manage than 
would be other legal or political arrangements between countries. 
Sometimes this leads countries to default to regulatory cooperation to 
solve their transnational problems. And sometimes it incentivizes 
regulators to look to their counterparts abroad to maximize their own 
interests, given that their regulatory ambits are globalizing anyway.  
Antitrust may exemplify this dynamic—though its global coordination 
remains in its early stages. Europeans and Americans have long differed 
on the sort of scrutiny appropriate to apply to new business 
combinations—Americans prefer to look only at the effect on consumers 
while Europeans have steadfastly examined the effects on consumers and 
competitors in mergers.
48
 Reconciling these two paradigms and many of 
the other basic questions of international antitrust has never been easy to 
do.
49
 Despite these distinct differences, the International Competition 
Network (ICN)—comprised of most of the antitrust regulators in the 
world—has declared somewhat hopefully that American and European 
merger visions are moving ―towards convergence.‖50  
The amazing thing about the ICN‘s statement is that it may be correct. 
Since the aborted Honeywell-G.E. merger of 2000 (the United States was 
willing to permit the two American companies to merge, but the EU 
 
 
 48. Of course, a change in the American approach may only happen more quickly as large 
developing countries such as India, Brazil, and China increase the intensity and quality of the 
competition regulation to which they can commit.  
 49. As James Whitman has observed:  
[I]t is surely the case that Microsoft must act in a world in which there will be two different 
regimes for years to come. In this dual world, its decisions must be justified in the United 
States in terms of ―consumers‘ interest‖ and the benefits of competition, while those same 
decisions must be justified in Europe, at least in part, in terms of the interests of ―all 
companies.‖ Europe may have moved somewhat in the direction of U.S. law, but at a 
minimum it remains more oriented toward the producer interest of competitors. 
James Q. Whitman, Consumerism Versus Producerism: A Study in Comparative Law, 117 YALE L.J. 
340, 376 (2007).  
 50. Stanley M. Gorinson & Robert Pambianco, U.S. and European Merger Policies Move 
Towards Convergence, WASH. LEGAL FOUND. LEGAL BACKGROUNDER (Aug. 9, 2002), available at 
http://www.wlf.org/upload/080902LBGorinson.pdf; see also Press Release, International Competition 
Network, International Competition Network Advances Cooperation and Convergence at 12th Annual 
ICN Conference (Apr. 26, 2013), available at http://internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/ 
library/doc897.pdf. 
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blocked the effort),
51
 there has been little of the high-stakes conflict on 
antitrust matters that marked the 1990s.
52
  
Moreover, as Chad Damro has found, managing the regulatory 
relationship between the United States and Europe, despite these 
fundamental disagreements on policy, has been easier to do through the 
regulators themselves, especially when their political overseers disagree: 
―[I]nstead of seeking a treaty to establish a formal cooperative framework, 
the competition regulators preferred using their own discretionary 
authority to pursue a non-treaty agreement. This behavior is explained by 
the regulators‘ desire to reduce the likelihood of political intervention.‖53 
There is more to the pull of regulatory cooperation, of course. Political 
scientists have often speculated that ―epistemic communities‖ of 
regulatory elites can ease the process of harmonization across borders, as 
these communities speak a common language and feel comfortable with 
one another.
54
 There is also the matter of protecting regulatory turf through 
a ―two-level game‖ with the body politic and foreign interests.55 All of this 
means that, in addition to the mere fact of globalization, and the ease of 
turning to regulatory cooperation to address it, there are agency-level 
incentives pushing regulators to solve international problems on their own. 
 
 
 51. For a discussion of the Honeywell-G.E. fiasco, see Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, 
Antitrust Law and Regulatory Gaming, 87 TEX. L. REV. 685, 705 n.87 (2009) (―[T]he European 
Community blocked a merger between General Electric and Honeywell that U.S. antitrust authorities 
had allowed, raising the ire of both antitrust authorities and the business community in the United 
States.‖). 
 52. Edward T. Swaine, The Local Law of Global Antitrust, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 627, 631 
(2001) (―The question for many, in consequence, is why greater international cooperation has not 
transpired, or if it ever can . . . .‖) (footnote omitted); Anne-Marie Slaughter, Sovereignty and Power in 
a Networked World Order, 40 STAN. J. INT‘L L. 283, 323 (2004) (―[T]he prominence of the conflict 
should not be allowed to obscure the remarkable record of ‗cooperative relationship[s] on regulation‘ 
between E.U. and U.S. antitrust regulators.‖) (quoting Editorial, Merger-Busting in Europe, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 21, 2001, at A24, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2001/06/21/opinion/merger-
busting-in-europe.html).  
 53. Chad Damro, Transatlantic Competition Policy: Domestic and International Sources of EU-
US Cooperation, 12 EUR. J. INT‘L REL. 171, 173 (2006). 
 54. See, e.g., Peter M. Haas, Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy 
Coordination, 46 INT‘L ORG. 1, 3 (1992) (defining ―epistemic community‖); Peter M. Haas, Do 
Regimes Matter? Epistemic Communities and Mediterranean Pollution Control, 43 INT‘L ORG. 377, 
384–85 (1989) (describing the successful efforts of an ecological epistemic community). 
 55. See Robert D. Putnam, Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games, 42 
INT‘L ORG. 427, 434 (1988) (describing two-level game theory); see also Kenneth W. Abbott, 
Enriching Rational Choice Institutionalism for the Study of International Law, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 5, 
22–23 (applying Putnam‘s two-level game framework to international law); Rachel Brewster, Stepping 
Stone or Stumbling Block: Incrementalism and National Climate Change Legislation, 28 YALE L. & 
POL‘Y REV. 245, 312 (2010) (applying Putnam‘s two-level game framework to climate change 
legislation). 
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C. Regulatory Cooperation Institutionalizes Well 
The third, and also related, reason why the regulatory turn to 
international governance is likely to expand is because, once 
institutionalized, that cooperation gradually can develop its own 
momentum.  
This institutionalization story is supported more by observation of 
practice than by theory; it is essentially a slippery slope account, and there 
is nothing inevitable about slippery slopes.
56
 But time and again, when 
regulators go overseas and create institutions, they find ways for those 
institutions to mean something. And while not every effort at regulatory 
globalization has been a success, enough have prospered to create 
occasionally uncomfortable situations where things have gone much 
further than anyone ever thought they would, or could. 
For example, financial regulators have continued to institutionalize and 
elaborate the sort of work they have been doing, even in the face of a 
terrible financial crisis where they were arguably quite ineffective.
57
 Tim 
Büthe and Walter Mattli have documented the way that cooperation on 
accounting rules developed through the International Accounting 
Standards Board and its predecessor networks even in the face of sharp 
disagreement between countries on the appropriate accounting standards to 
use.
58
 And while it is obviously the case that not every cross-border 
interaction inevitably results in a sovereignty mismatch problem, there are 
 
 
 56. As Eugene Volokh has observed, ―[t]he slippery slope is in some ways a helpful metaphor, 
but as with many metaphors, it starts by enriching our vision and ends by clouding it.‖ Eugene Volokh, 
The Mechanisms of the Slippery Slope, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1026, 1137 (2003). For further discussion, 
see Ruth E. Sternglantz, Raining on the Parade of Horribles: Of Slippery Slopes, Faux Slopes, and 
Justice Scalia‟s Dissent in Lawrence v. Texas, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1097 (2005). 
 57. ―The Group of 20 (G20) has, following the financial crisis, created some sort of order in 
international financial regulation, with one network of NETWORKS meant to oversee many of the 
others, engaged in their own task-specific work.‖ David Zaring, Finding Legal Principle in Global 
Financial Regulation, 52 VA. J. INT‘L L. 683, 692 (2012). 
 58. TIM BÜTHE & WALTER MATTLI, ASSESSING THE IASB: RESULTS OF A BUSINESS SURVEY 
ABOUT INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL REPORTING STANDARDS AND THE IASB‘S OPERATIONS, 
ACCOUNTABILITY, AND RESPONSIVENESS TO STAKEHOLDERS (2008), available at http://www.iasplus 
.com/en/binary/resource/0811assessingtheiasb.pdf. Moreover, ―[t]he entities, although they began as 
informal regimes, have developed into recognizable forms of international administration over the last 
decade.‖ David Zaring, Informal Procedure, Hard and Soft, in International Administration, 5 CHI. J. 
INT‘L L. 547, 548 (2005). As Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman have observed, ―uniform 
accounting standards are rapidly crystallizing out of the babble of national rules and practices into two 
well-defined sets of international standards: the GAAP accounting rules administered by the Financial 
Auditing Standards Board in the U.S. and the International Accounting Standards administered by the 
International Accounting Standards Committee in London.‖ Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, 
The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439, 457 (2001). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol91/iss1/2
  
 
 
 
 
2013] SOVEREIGNTY MISMATCH 77 
 
 
 
 
reasons to think carefully about the ways that international regulators can 
leave their domestic supervisors behind. 
The accounting story is particularly instructive. It is a cautionary tale 
for Americans because American regulators, by abandoning an already 
ongoing harmonization effort in the 1990s, lost their ability to affect the 
effort, and now must begin the process of conforming to it.
59
  
International accounting standards—the idea that companies listed on 
stock exchanges from Stockholm to Shanghai might report their results in 
the same way—have always been an attractive regulatory goal. In the 
1980s, capital market regulators agreed to endorse an effort by 
professional accounting organizations to try for global harmonization of 
accounting rules.
60
 But the effort proved controversial, as American 
regulators comfortable with the unique American approach to financial 
statements withdrew their support for the enterprise in the early 1990s.
61
  
That exit, however, did not stop the process of devising common 
accounting standards. Instead, the international efforts moved to Europe; 
the creation of international accounting standards after the SEC‘s rejection 
of the prospect of them, has been managed by the International 
Accounting Standards Board (IASB), a public-private arrangement based 
in London created in 2001.
62
 The IASB has devised a set of accounting 
standards, the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), which 
has enjoyed quick adoption in European and other countries. IFRS was 
essentially created without American participation.
63
  
And therefore, perhaps unsurprisingly, IFRS is rather different from 
American accounting rules. It is a principles—rather than rules—based 
accounting system, in that it is less technical than traditional American 
accounting, and relies more on the gestalt of a company‘s returns to assess 
 
 
 59. As James Cox has observed, ―[i]ncreasingly, the SEC‘s regulatory posture on financial 
reporting issues is one of accommodation to foreign issuers rather than its historical position of 
demanding obeisance to the U.S. way.‖ James D. Cox, Coping in a Global Marketplace: Survival 
Strategies for a 75-Year-Old SEC, 95 VA. L. REV. 941, 944 (2009). 
 60.  For a basic overview of the back and forth, see William W. Bratton, Heedless Globalism: 
The SEC‟s Roadmap to Accounting Convergence, 79 U. CIN. L. REV. 471, 472 (2010) (observing that 
―[t]he Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), long the backer and protector of GAAP and the 
FASB, lately changed course, defecting against them in favor of IFRS and its generator, the 
International Accounting Standards Board (IASB)‖). 
 61. See Cox, supra note 59, at 944.  
 62. For an overview, see About the IFRS Foundation and the IASB, IFRS FOUNDATION, 
http://www.ifrs.org/The+organisation/IASCF+and+IASB.htm (describing the history of the IASB). 
 63. See, e.g., Bratton, supra note 23, at 472 (―The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), 
long the backer and protector of GAAP and the FASB, lately changed course, defecting against them 
in favor of IFRS and its generator, the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB).‖). 
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its accuracy.
64
 The United States had—and, for the moment, still has—a 
unique rules-based and reputedly challenging set of accounting standards 
that differ greatly from those of any other nation, the Generally Accepted 
Accounting Principles (GAAP).
65
  
But, faced with a cascade of adoptions of IFRS, those GAAP principles 
are on the verge of being abandoned, despite the SEC‘s doubling down on 
their necessity in the 1990s.
66
 As foreign jurisdictions have gained more 
and more of the business of floating stocks and bonds and raising capital, 
American capital market regulators have given up hope that they might do 
so in ways consistent with the complicated GAAP.
67
 The SEC has 
permitted foreign companies that list on American stock markets to use 
IFRS to file their American annual and quarterly reports.
68
 And the SEC 
will surely accede to IFRS soon.
69
  
Accounting is technical, and acronyms like GAAP and IFRS daunt 
almost as much as they reveal what, exactly, the distinction between rules-
based and principles-based accounting really amounts to. But the import of 
the triumph of IFRS can be gleaned by abstracting away from it, and from 
the details of accounting. The commitment to an international effort in 
accounting has worked a sea change in the way that companies report their 
results, and the sea change has come without much American 
 
 
 64. For an overview, albeit a skeptical one, see Lawrence A. Cunningham, A Prescription to 
Retire the Rhetoric of “Principles-Based Systems” in Corporate Law, Securities Regulation, and 
Accounting, 60 VAND. L. REV. 1411, 1486–91 (2007). 
 65. For a laudatory overview of GAAP, see Louis Lowenstein, Financial Transparency and 
Corporate Governance: You Manage What You Measure, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1335 (1996). 
 66. See Cunningham, supra note 23, at 1 (―In the most revolutionary securities law development 
since the New Deal, the SEC is poised to jettison rules requiring companies to apply recognized U.S. 
accounting standards by inviting use of a new set of international standards created by a private 
London-based organization.‖). 
 67. For a discussion, see William W. Bratton & Lawrence A. Cunningham, Treatment 
Differences and Political Realities in the GAAP-IFRS Debate, 95 VA. L. REV. 989, 989 (2009) (―[T]he 
globalization wave continues to rise and GAAP‘s days appear to be numbered . . . .‖). 
 68. SEC Staff have made their views known on the question in a recent work plan. DIV. OF 
CORP. FIN. & OFFICE OF THE CHIEF ACCOUNTANT, SEC, WORK PLAN FOR THE CONSIDERATION OF 
INCORPORATING INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL REPORTING STANDARDS INTO THE FINANCIAL 
REPORTING SYSTEM FOR U.S. ISSUERS: AN ANALYSIS OF IFRS IN PRACTICE (Nov. 6, 2011), available 
at http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/globalaccountingstandards/ifrs-work-plan-paper-111611-practice.pdf. 
 69. For SEC Staff statements on the agency‘s cautious embrace of IFRS, see id., and OFFICE OF 
THE CHIEF ACCOUNTANT, SEC, WORK PLAN FOR THE CONSIDERATION OF INCORPORATING 
INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL REPORTING STANDARDS INTO THE FINANCIAL REPORTING SYSTEM FOR 
U.S. ISSUERS: EXPLORING A POSSIBLE METHOD OF INCORPORATION (May 26, 2011), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/globalaccountingstandards/ifrs-work-plan-paper-052611.pdf. See also 
Michael Cohn, Investors Predict U.S. Will Adopt IFRS, ACCT. TODAY (Nov. 16, 2012), http://www 
.accountingtoday.com/news/Investors-Predict-US-Adopt-IFRS-64689-1.html. 
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involvement—even though it will, in the near future, affect American 
companies as much as anyone else.  
Thus, this story of accounting standards illustrates what those who 
worry what happens when regulators meet in a room have always 
suspected. Regulatory cooperation is easy to institutionalize—even when 
it crosses borders. Its propensity towards momentum is not a universal 
law, to be sure, but regulators ignore cross-border efforts at their peril, 
because those efforts can set the standards for even the most independent 
and recalcitrant jurisdictions, if the circumstances are right.  
D. Conclusion 
The three comparative advantages of regulatory cooperation—that the 
alternatives are costly, that regulators prefer cooperation to those 
alternatives, and that, once institutionalized, regulatory cooperation has the 
potential to obtain momentum—are, of course, related. They are also 
testable, although this Article will stick to hypothesis generation, and 
leave the testing to future work.
70
 The hypotheses will be borne out (or 
falsified) by the actual practice of states, bureaucrats, and interest groups 
across borders in the coming decades.  
Moreover, to be sure, skeptics of these comparative advantages exist. 
Indeed, there are still skeptics about the potential for international 
cooperation as a regulatory matter in any sphere. Pierre-Hugues Verdier 
has expressed doubt about the potential of financial cooperation across 
borders to really be significant beyond possible coordinative interests in 
economic liberalization and the reduction of trade barriers.
71
 Realists like 
John Mearsheimer argue that state cooperation is always likely to be 
elusive and fleeting in an anarchic world, where survival is never 
guaranteed and like-mindedness is accordingly suborned by ruthless 
competition.
72
 Lawyers such as Jack Goldsmith and Eric Posner have 
adapted these realist insights to international law and international 
relations, and generally found the bindingness of international legal 
arrangements to be wanting in a world where states constantly compete.
73
 
It is fair to say that, to these observers, the inevitability of regulatory 
collaboration is in doubt. 
 
 
 70. The prediction that regulatory cooperation will prosper disproportionately as the world grows 
ever more interconnected is an empirical one.  
 71. Pierre-Hugues Verdier, Transnational Regulatory Networks and Their Limits, 34 YALE J. 
INT‘L L. 113, 171–72 (2009).  
 72. JOHN J. MEARSHEIMER, THE TRAGEDY OF GREAT POWER POLITICS (2001). 
 73. JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2005). 
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But the burgeoning degree of cooperation that exists even now—a 
significant transformation from the post-World War II legal settlement that 
is hard to explain in realist terms, wherein state interests and degrees of 
cooperation should never change
74—suggests that these observers ignore 
the mechanisms of regulatory cooperation at their peril. Broad skepticism, 
at any rate, permits lawyers to ignore real problems with the kind of 
cooperation that actually is being pursued, if they simply assume that it 
will not last. Given the degree and amount of regulatory cooperation on 
the most important issues confronting countries today, such a strategy 
would be unwise. 
II. THE SOVEREIGNTY MISMATCH PROBLEM AS A PROBLEM OF DOMESTIC 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
Two rulemakings and a judicial decision illustrate a gap in legal 
thinking about the international forays of American regulators that 
exemplifies the sovereignty mismatch problem in the United States.  
First, on June 17, 2011, the Federal Reserve Board observed in a notice 
of proposed rulemaking that it ―and the other federal banking agencies 
continue to work on implementing Basel III in the United States.‖75 Its 
notice suggested that the decision had already been made: banks were 
getting Basel III (the term refers to the third iteration of an international 
agreement by the banking agencies to require that the banks they 
supervised keep a minimum amount of capital on hand). The question was 
what the banks should be required to do about it. Accordingly, the Fed 
sought comments from bank holding companies as to how they would 
meet the terms of the international agreement.
76
  
Then, on June 28, after finalizing a separate rulemaking, the primary 
U.S. banking agencies warned banks that ―with the joint efforts of the U.S. 
banking agencies and the Basel Committee to enhance the regulatory 
capital rules applicable to internationally active banking organizations, the 
agencies anticipate that their capital requirements will be amended‖ in the 
following years, as Basel refined its banking requirements.
77
 
 
 
 74.  For a TRADITIONAL version of this realist take, see John J. Mearsheimer, The False Promise 
of International Institutions, 19 INT‘L SECURITY, Winter 1994–1995, at 5, 7. 
 75. Capital Plans, 76 Fed. Reg. 35,351, 35,355 (proposed June 17, 2011) (to be codified at 12 
C.F.R. pt. 225). 
 76. Id. 
 77. Risk-Based Capital Standards: Advanced Capital Adequacy Framework—Basel II; 
Establishment of a Risk-Based Capital Floor, 76 Fed. Reg. 37,620, 37,625 (June 28, 2011) (codified at 
12 C.F.R. pts. 3, 208, 225, and 325). 
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Meanwhile, a court granting a motion to dismiss a ―Basel III accord 
violations‖ claim had recently complained that it was not clear ―how or if 
Basel III applies or has regulatory effect in the United States. Upon the 
Court's own research, it has found that the United States is not even a 
signatory to Basel III.‖78 
How can an agency pledge fealty—indeed, ongoing fealty—to the 
work of a grouping of regulators that the United States has neither signed 
nor ratified? 
The question admits of no easy answer. International policymaking, 
while increasingly elaborate and welcome in those contexts where 
domestic regulation is likely to fail or be insufficient to resolve global 
problems, is not without its doctrinal difficulties. Basel III exemplifies the 
problem.
79
 Basel III is a set of rules, in that its standards are legislative in 
nature and regulate the future conduct of financial institutions.
80
 Once the 
Basel Committee agreed on those rules, its American members are 
obligated to return to their jurisdiction and implement them.
81
 But rules, at 
least in the United States, are subject to a variety of constraints, 
culminating in judicial review; Basel itself offers none of these constraints. 
As a matter of American administrative law, procedural specialists seem 
 
 
 78. Feller v. Indymac Mortg. Servs., No. 09-5720 RJB, 2010 WL 342187, at *3 (W.D. Wash. 
Jan. 26, 2010) (omitted capitalizations). 
 79. For an example of this critique, see Pierre-Hugues Verdier, U.S. Implementation of Basel II: 
Lessons for Informal International Law-Making (June 30, 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=1879391. (arguing that the Basel Committee is likely to both fail to meet its goals and to 
transgress American good governance principles in doing so). This is not to suggest that the American 
response to Basel II was the only problem with that particular accord. See, e.g., Jeffery Atik, Basel II: 
A Post-Crisis Post-Mortem, 19 TRANSNAT‘L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 731, 734–35 (2011) (identifying 
three weaknesses in Basel II: (1) ―the illusion of safety that Basel II engendered—an illusion that 
compliance with Basel II meant that bank capital would be ‗adequate‘ to withstand a crisis‖; (2) ―the 
use of credit ratings (as a proxy for credit sensitivity) to determine the regulatory capital needed to 
support the holding of particular financial assets‖; and (3) ―the negative spiral effect resulting from the 
interplay between asset value declines occasioned by market-to-market accounting and Basel II‘s rigid 
capital demands, generally (and perhaps incorrectly) described as procyclicality‖). 
 80. See Nat‘l Petroleum Refiners Ass‘n v. FTC, 482 F.2d 672, 683 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (Wright, J.) 
(noting differences between rulemaking and adjudications and claiming the existence of a ―judicial 
trend favoring rule-making over adjudication for development of new agency policy‖). For discussions 
about the nature of a rule, and its comparative advantage (or not) over adjudication, see Ronald M. 
Levin, The Case For (Finally) Fixing the APA‟s Definition of “Rule”, 56 ADMIN. L. REV. 1077, 1080-
83 (2004); M. Elizabeth Magill, Agency Choice of Policymaking Form, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1383, 
1390–98 (2004) (describing the implications of agency rulemaking versus adjudication); David L. 
Shapiro, The Choice of Rulemaking or Adjudication in the Development of Administrative Policy, 78 
HARV. L. REV. 921, 954–58 (1965). 
 81. The Basel Committee has created a set of procedures to monitor this implementation. BANK 
FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, BASIL III IMPLEMENTATION ASSESSMENT PROGRAMME, 
http://www.bis.org/bcbs/implementation.htm (last visited Oct. 10, 2013). 
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likely to find the arrangement between the international standard setters 
and the domestic implementers to be unworkable.  
The administrative law problems with the new role of the international 
regulatory architecture are fourfold: there are procedural and delegation 
problems, as well as due process and Appointments Clause problems. 
Together these doctrines provide legal bases for a more instinctual 
commitment to democratic governance at odds with the 
internationalization of oversight. What is there to make of a regulatory 
process that has gone global, when no democratic process has joined it? 
This is the problem of the democratic deficit, and it is a hardy concern for 
every international administrative effort; the mismatch between 
transnational and domestic regulatory styles creates a procedural deficit 
that contributes to the democratic one.  
In what follows, I discuss these four doctrinal problems and the 
democratic deficit that they are designed to guard against. These problems 
pose serious difficulties at the interface of domestic and international 
administrative process. In the next Part, I identify the ways in which the 
international financial regulatory initiatives have sought to get around 
them. The bottom line is one that is more legally realist than doctrinally 
unambiguous—it is that domestic administrative law, at least in finance, is 
hardly so nuanced when it comes to observing the procedural niceties that 
the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) would lead us to suspect are 
required, while the international regulatory process is not without some 
real, if voluntary, procedural protections of its own.
82
 In this sense, 
although we may not be entirely happy with the way the sovereignty 
mismatch problem has been resolved so far, the way that financial 
regulators have addressed it provides a start to bringing international 
regulatory cooperation within the law‘s domain. In the final part, I offer a 
recommendation that can finish the job.  
A. Procedural Challenges 
The procedural problems with the regime of global rulemaking, 
followed by domestic implementation, are particularly thorny. American 
administrative law requires the publication of proposed rules, the receipt 
and evaluation of public comment, and the issuance of a final rule before 
 
 
 82. The APA may be found at 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559, 701–706 (2000). For a discussion, see infra 
note 171 and accompanying text. 
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its citizens may be subjected to the tender mercies of its agencies.
83
 Ernest 
Gellhorn has summarized the process as follows: 
[a]s an unelected body, an agency is not as free to adopt rules as 
Congress is to adopt laws. An agency must give the public notice, 
an opportunity for comment, and justify its results with a concise 
statement of the rule's basis and purpose, including a reasoned 
explanation of why the rule is authorized and necessary.
84
 
Judicial review is the final step in the process of rulemaking. Such 
review, if perhaps not as aggressive as some scholars of administrative 
rulemaking have been inclined to suggest,
85
 results in the reversal of the 
agency‘s proposed promulgation approximately one-third of the time.86 
Indeed, many scholars argue that the threat of judicial review, and the 
desire to avoid reversal, have changed the character of American 
rulemaking, leading to a vast expansion in the detail set forth in notices of 
proposed rules, final rules, and response to comments, all of which appear 
in the Federal Register.
87
 
It is not clear whether any of these requirements are met through the 
bifurcated international regulatory process, where the decision is made by 
a body outside of the purview of the APA (and certainly one that does not 
publish in the Federal Register, as is required by 5 U.S.C. § 553 unless 
there is ―actual notice‖ of the proposed rule), and then is presented as a fait 
accompli by the domestic agencies that belong to the international process 
during their own implementing rulemakings.  
 
 
 83. JAMES T. O‘REILLY, ADMINISTRATIVE RULEMAKING §§ 4.01–7.06 (1983). 
 84. Ernest Gellhorn, Shaping Administrative Law, 43 ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 5 (1991). 
 85. See Jason Webb Yackee & Susan Webb Yackee, Administrative Procedures and 
Bureaucratic Performance: Is Federal Rule-making “Ossified”?, 20 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 
261, 261 (2009) (utilizing ―data that cover all active federal rule-writing agencies from 1983 to 2006,‖ 
and concluding that the ―results largely disconfirm the ossification thesis‖).  
 86.  David Zaring, Reasonable Agencies, 96 VA. L. REV. 135, 137 (2010) (―The outcomes of 
actual cases prove the point: whether the question is one of fact, law, or arbitrariness, whether the 
agency procedures were formal or informal, whether judicial deference is required or not, the courts—
even though in theory they would apply different degrees of scrutiny to each of these questions—
reverse agencies slightly less than one third of the time.‖). 
 87. The start date for this growth of detail varies, depending on the administrative law scholar. 
Some point to 1978, the date of the Supreme Court‘s decision in Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. 
Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1978) (limiting judicial review of rulemakings to the 
rulemaking record). See, e.g., Gillian E. Metzger, The Story of Vermont Yankee: A Cautionary Tale of 
Judicial Review and Nuclear Waste, in ADMINISTRATIVE LAW STORIES 124, 126–29 (Peter L. Strauss 
ed., 2006) (describing the growth of rulemaking records in the wake of the decision). Others suggest 
that the relevant date is 1983, when the Supreme Court decided Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass‘n v. State 
Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983) (describing the nature of arbitrary and capricious 
review). Or one could look to the 1971 Overton Park decision. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. 
v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971) (first case that mooted ―hard look‖ review of agency action).  
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The problems with this process are twofold. First, when agencies 
approach their foreign counterparts as negotiators over global solutions to 
cross-border problems, they do so absent warnings in the Federal Register 
and without any intention of publicizing the contents of their negotiations. 
Second, if those negotiations are successful, then the American agency 
will return from their negotiations with new rules, which may duly be 
subjected to notice and comment, followed by judicial review. However, 
at this point the jig is up, as the decision was already made, and the 
procedural requirements of the APA are mere routines that must be 
performed before promulgation and enforcement. 
B. Delegation 
The problem of the interplay between the domestic and the 
international also raises the fundamental, if often overblown, problem of 
the nondelegation doctrine, and the more serious problem of agency 
subdelegation absent congressional authorization. Both doctrines restrict 
the power to grant rulemaking authority to someone else: when Congress 
does it, it is almost always permitted; when agencies give up their 
rulemaking authority, however, judicial scrutiny is much more searching.  
Nondelegation is the doctrine that limits congressional action,
88
 while 
subdelegation is a Congress-protecting doctrine that prevents delegatees 
from abusing the privileges given them by the legislature.
89
 
―Nondelegation‖ is not the same thing as ―no delegation‖; the doctrine 
permits delegations, but only when Congress has provided an ―intelligible 
principle‖ to guide its delegate‘s exercise of the authority given it.90 The 
 
 
 88. In this way, the nondelegation doctrine ―ensures . . . that important choices of social policy 
are made by Congress, the branch of our Government most responsive to the popular will.‖ Indus. 
Union Dep‘t v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 685 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring); see also 
Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 371 (1989) (―The nondelegation doctrine is rooted in the 
principle of separation of powers that underlies our tripartite system of Government.‖). For a recent 
discussion of the doctrine, and its survival as a canon of construction, see Michael C. Pollack, Note, 
Chevron‟s Regrets: The Persistent Vitality of the Nondelegation Doctrine, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 316 
(2011). 
 89. Jason Marisam has put it somewhat differently: ―In the case of the subdelegation doctrine, 
Congress is the principal and a federal agency is the agent.‖ Jason Marisam, The Interagency 
Marketplace, 96 MINN. L. REV. 886, 892 (2012) (footnote omitted). For further discussion, see 
Thomas W. Merrill, Rethinking Article I, Section 1: From Nondelegation to Exclusive Delegation, 104 
COLUM. L. REV. 2097, 2176 (2004) (―The exclusive delegation doctrine suggests that the President 
and executive branch agencies can subdelegate only if and to the extent Congress has authorized 
subdelegation. The exclusive delegation understanding tells us the Executive has no inherent authority 
to exercise legislative power.‖). 
 90. J. W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928). See also id. at 401 
(holding that a delegation of the power to change tariff rates did lay down an ―intelligible principle,‖ 
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doctrine has rarely been used to actually countermand legislation, but it 
occupies a prominent place in the fundaments of American governance—
Office of Legal Counsel opinions, for example, are replete with 
nondelegation doctrine references.
91
 Scholars such as Cass Sunstein have 
suggested that recent delegations may fall afoul of the doctrine, and that it 
also affects policymaking as an interpretive canon that courts use to cabin 
very broad claims of authority by agencies.
92
 Moreover, the intuition 
underlying the doctrine—that a rulemaking body given responsibility over 
a particular area should not be able to abandon the field and concede all 
the powers to some other outfit over that area—is not hard to discern.93  
 
 
because it specified that the tariffs could be adjusted within a statutorily prescribed range in order 
to ‖equalize the . . . differences in costs of production in the United States and the principal competing 
country‖). Thus, in Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 430 (1935), the Court rejected a 
statutory scheme where ―[c]ongress has declared no policy, has established no standard, has laid down 
no rule. There is no requirement, no definition of circumstances and conditions in which the [regulated 
act] is to be allowed or prohibited.‖ For a recent discussion of the doctrine, see Kevin M. Stack, The 
Constitutional Foundations of Chenery, 116 YALE L.J. 952, 981–1004 (2007). 
 91. The term ―nondelegation‖ or its like appears in fourteen publicly available Office of Legal 
Counsel opinions, including, most recently, one in 2011 (search conducted June 29, 2013; results 
available at https://a.next.westlaw.com/Search/Results.html?query=non-delegation&jurisdiction=ALL 
FEDS&contentType=ADMINDECISION&querySubmissionGuid=i0ad705210000013f126532d71f57d2
8f&categoryPageUrl=Home%2FAdministrativeDecisionsGuidance%2FFederalAdministrativeDecisions
Guidance%2FDepartmentofJusticeDOJ%2FUSAttorneyGeneralOpinions&searchId=i0ad705210000013f
1264e95a1f57d26a&transitionType=ListViewType&contextData=(sc.Search) (login required)). 
 92. Cass R. Sunstein, Is OSHA Unconstitutional?, 94 VA. L. REV. 1407, 1430 (2008) (―[A]s the 
doctrine now stands, it is necessary to ask how, if at all, OSHA limits the agency‘s room to ‗roam.‘‖); 
see also Pollack, supra note 88, at 318 (―While the Supreme Court has relied explicitly on the 
nondelegation doctrine only twice in its history, some Justices and appellate courts have continued to 
show a strong sensitivity to the doctrine. Moreover . . . the Court has issued at least two major opinions 
that nominally deny Chevron deference but are more deeply grounded in nondelegation principles 
. . . .‖) (footnote omitted). 
 93. As the Supreme Court has explained:  
The nondelegation doctrine is rooted in the principle of separation of powers that underlies 
our tripartite system of Government. The Constitution provides that ―[a]ll legislative Powers 
herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States,‖ U.S. Const., Art. I, § 1, and 
we long have insisted that ―the integrity and maintenance of the system of government 
ordained by the Constitution‖ mandate that Congress generally cannot delegate its legislative 
power to another Branch. Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 692 (1892). We also have recognized, 
however, that the separation-of-powers principle, and the nondelegation doctrine in particular, 
do not prevent Congress from obtaining the assistance of its coordinate Branches. 
Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 371–72. One of the many ways to think about what the doctrine is supposed to 
do—and a popular one, at that—is to think of it in political scientific terms. Peter H. Aranson et al., A 
Theory of Legislative Delegation, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 6 (1982) (―[Our] model postulates that an 
increase in delegated legislative authority will increase ‗agency costs,‘ (costs engendered by a 
divergence of the agent‘s goals and those of the principal) but will also diminish the principals‘ 
(legislators‘) decisionmaking costs (the cost of securing agreement on a course of action). A justice‘s 
preferred position on delegation is attainment of the degree of delegation that minimizes the sum of 
these two costs.‖). 
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The problem is particularly stark when posed internationally. The D.C. 
Circuit has said that treaties implemented by American agencies, whose 
status as a matter of American law is not entirely clear, pose ―serious 
constitutional questions in light of the nondelegation doctrine . . . .‖94 As 
Julian G. Ku has argued, ―Unlike delegations within the federal 
government, or to the states or private organizations, international 
delegations are made to international organizations largely independent of 
other mechanisms of federal control.‖95 Curtis Bradley has agreed that 
―transfers of authority by the United States to international institutions 
could be said to raise ‗delegation concerns.‘‖96 The problem identified by 
both Ku and Bradley is rooted in the conception that international grants 
are different than domestic ones. While delegations to the states, or the 
executive, even if exceptionally broad, do not raise the specter of entirely 
undemocratic outcomes, delegations to foreign regulatory bodies remove 
the decision maker from the polity altogether. 
The delegation concern most posed by the internationalization of 
policymaking is subdelegation by an agency to an outside body, rather 
than nondelegation. That doctrine is epitomized by the D.C. Circuit 
decision reversing an FCC order in which it subdelegated some of its 
rulemaking power under the Telecommunications Act of 1996 to state 
public utility commissions.
97
 Specifically, the court concluded that a 
subdelegation of authority, when made to an actor outside of the federal 
government required ―an affirmative showing of congressional 
 
 
 94. Natural Res. Def. Council v. EPA, 464 F.3d 1, 9 (D.C. Cir. 2006). Such a case might be 
presented by a treaty signed but never ratified. See id. (involving the methyl bromide exception to the 
Montreal Protocol). 
 95. Ku, supra note 30 at 59. Ku argues that there are ―three functional justifications for applying 
the nondelegation doctrine to international delegations: (1) to force political accountability; (2) to 
bolster the political legitimacy of international adjudication; and (3) to ensure that the institutions with 
greater expertise in foreign affairs remain in control of compliance with international obligations.‖ Id. 
at 66. See also Curtis A. Bradley & Judith G. Kelley, The Concept of International Delegation, 71 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 2 (2008) (defining international delegation as ―a grant of authority by two 
or more states to an international body to make decisions or take actions,‖ regardless of whether those 
decisions or actions are binding). 
 96. Bradley, supra note 9, at 1558. Judge A. Raymond Randolph wrote, and Judge Karen 
LeCraft Henderson joined, an opinion casting doubt on the ability of the body designated by the 
Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer. See Natural Res. Def. Council, 464 
F.3d at 8 (explaining that ―because the Protocol authorizes future agreements concerning the scope of 
the critical-use exemption, those future agreements must define the scope of EPA‘s Clean Air Act 
authority,‖ but ―[i]f the ‗decisions‘ are ‗law‘—enforceable in federal court like statutes or legislative 
rules—then Congress either has delegated lawmaking authority to an international body or authorized 
amendments to a treaty without presidential signature or Senate ratification, in violation of Article II of 
the Constitution‖) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 97. U.S. Tel. Ass‘n v. FCC, 359 F.3d 554 (D.C. Cir. 2004). 
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authorization.‖98 The court‘s ―affirmative showing‖ requirement rested on 
a few basic principles of good governance: 
When an agency delegates authority to its subordinate, 
responsibility—and thus accountability—clearly remain with the 
federal agency. But when an agency delegates power to outside 
parties, lines of accountability may blur, undermining an important 
democratic check on government decision-making. Also, delegation 
to outside entities increases the risk that these parties will not share 
the agency‘s ―national vision and perspective,‖ and thus may pursue 
goals inconsistent with those of the agency and the underlying 
statutory scheme.
99
 
This subdelegation doctrine is not only a domestic matter; it has 
already been deployed to slow precisely the sort of international regulation 
subject to the sovereignty mismatch problem. In Defenders of Wildlife v. 
Gutierrez, the D.C. Circuit warned the Coast Guard against a 
subdelegation of authority to the International Maritime Organization.
100
 
Specifically, it warned that ―if the Coast Guard had delegated some or all 
of its decisionmaking authority under the Ports and Waterways Safety Act 
to an outside body not subordinate to it, such as the International Maritime 
Organization, the delegation would be unlawful absent affirmative 
evidence that Congress intended the delegation.‖101 While the 
nondelegation doctrine is not vibrant, at least as a winning argument in 
litigation against the government, the subdelegation of agency power to 
other sovereigns outside the federal government has a stronger track 
record. 
C. Appointments 
The Appointments Clause, at least as interpreted by the Supreme Court, 
forbids Congress, or anyone else, from interfering with the President‘s 
power to appoint senior federal officials—so-called ―Officers of the 
United States,‖ who must also be subject to Senate confirmation.102 
Appointments Clause problems have prevented the creation of a Federal 
Election Commission led by officials appointed by Congress, for 
 
 
 98. Id. at 565. 
 99. Id. at 565–66 (citations omitted). 
 100. Defenders of Wildlife v. Gutierrez, 532 F.3d 913, 927 (D.C. Cir. 2008). 
 101. Id. 
 102. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
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example.
103
 The legal test turns on a functional inquiry, concerning 
whether constraining the ability of the President to nominate the officers 
for a particular office would impinge too much on the executive‘s core 
powers
104—a pretty imprecise balancing test to be sure. Because the 
Appointments Clause anticipates that some federal officers will not need 
to be appointed by the President (it allows for appointments by the ―Heads 
of Departments‖ and courts),105 this test has not been a particularly 
difficult one to meet. 
Nonetheless, it works, in reality, to bolster some of the principles 
behind the nondelegation doctrine. Just as Congress cannot give away a 
massive quantity of its legislative powers, nor can it create institutions that 
would supplant the powers that used to belong to the executive branch. 
John Yoo has accordingly argued that the Appointments Clause might be 
violated if the United States joined a treaty creating a secretariat staffed 
with officials who could then oversee Americans.
106
 Curtis Bradley, who 
was particularly worried about treaty-style delegations like Kyoto, has 
explained the Appointments Clause issue with international delegation as 
follows: 
In addition to potentially falling within the formal terms of the 
Appointments Clause, international delegations may also implicate 
the functional policies of the clause. The requirements of the clause, 
the Supreme Court has explained, are designed both to prevent 
aggrandizement of power by one branch at the expense of another 
and to ensure public accountability in the appointments process. 
According to the Court, the clause ―reflects [our] Framers‘ 
 
 
 103.  See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 140 (1976). 
 104. The test was set out in Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988). For a definitive gloss on 
separation-of-powers issues, see Peter L. Strauss, Formal and Functional Approaches to Separation-
of-Powers Questions—A Foolish Inconsistency?, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 488 (1987) (describing 
functionalism as an approach which permits government flexibility while protecting ―core functions,‖ 
and formalism as an approach that holds constitutional provisions regarding structure as more 
absolute); see also Nick Bravin, Note, Is Morrison v. Olson Still Good Law? The Court‟s New 
Appointments Clause Jurisprudence, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1103, 1144 (1998) (arguing that ―the current 
appointment provisions for independent counsels are unconstitutional‖). 
 105.  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 106. See John C. Yoo, The New Sovereignty and the Old Constitution: The Chemical Weapons 
Convention and the Appointments Clause, 15 CONST. COMMENT. 87, 117 (1998) (―First, the [treaty] 
grants the power to search American facilities and sites to officials of an international organization 
who are not appointed pursuant to the Appointments Clause, who are not members of the executive 
branch, and who are not accountable to the President. Second, the treaty grants the authority to select 
the locations to be inspected to the Technical Secretariat. Their decisions neither are made by officers 
of the United States subject to standards established by federal law, nor are they reviewable by an 
American official appointed by, and accountable to, the President.‖). 
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conclusion that widely distributed appointment power subverts 
democratic government.‖ Thus, even when there is no interference 
with executive branch prerogatives, the clause ―prevents Congress 
from dispensing power too freely; it limits the universe of eligible 
recipients of the power to appoint.‖107 
One can, of course, imagine that the functional policies of the 
Appointments Clause appear with even greater effect when the party 
vested with the power is not even subject to the laws of the United States. 
And so the Appointments Clause issues look a bit like the delegation, 
both sub- and non-, issues. The decision by Congress or an agency to give 
policymaking authority to informal international regulatory efforts could, 
if the grant is large enough, take core executive functions away from the 
President, and therefore implicate the clause similar to the way it could 
create delegation problems. If implicated, the clause would require 
presidential appointment and Senate confirmation of the international 
official, hard though it is to imagine such a scenario.  
The Appointments Clause is no dead letter,
108
 but its applicability to the 
international context, where the executive branch has special foreign 
affairs authority, is more problematic. Indeed, there has never been a case 
successfully brought against institutions like NATO, where foreign 
generals frequently command Congressionally-appointed American 
ones.
109
 It is hard to imagine that the Congressional voice provided by the 
Appointments Clause must be vindicated in building complex 
relationships with foreign states in many international contexts. 
Regulation, however, is a more interesting question, given the importance 
of the Congressional voice in setting international economic policy. 
Accordingly, for the ever increasing cooperation in issues like money 
laundering (where the UN Security Council has the putative power to 
direct American officials to freeze the assets of American citizens 
suspected of terrorism),
110
 let alone for cooperation in more lowly matters 
 
 
 107. Bradley, supra note 9, at 1563 (quoting Freytag v. Comm‘r, 501 U.S. 868, 880, 885 (1991)) 
(other footnote citations omitted). 
 108. For example, in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), the Court used the clause to undo a 
congressional effort to reform elections, and in Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926), the Court 
held that the President must retain the power to remove executive branch officials under an ―implicit 
removal‖ correlate of the clause. 
 109. Though the matter has been raised by academics. See Bradley, supra note 9, at 1570 n.58 
(cataloging such delegation concerns). 
 110. The UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1373, which requires nations to freeze terrorist 
assets, on September 28, 2001. See S.C. Res. 1373, para. 1, U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373, at 2 
(Sept. 28, 2001), available at https://www.unodc.org/pdf/crime/terrorism/res_1373_english.pdf. 
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of financial stability, it is a question to which government lawyers will 
need to provide an answer. 
D. Due Process 
The Constitution‘s requirement that citizens, including corporations, 
not be deprived of their property without due process is also implicated by 
international rulemaking, which only occasionally offers such protections 
voluntarily. The problem is not hard to discern: as regulatory globalization 
involves policymaking affecting the property interests of American firms 
and citizens, those parties might expect to have a pre-deprivation notice of 
the scheme and ―some sort of hearing‖ If their property turns out to be at 
risk.
111
 
Determining the kind of process due in these cases usually requires a 
look at the oft-invoked three-factor test in Mathews v. Eldridge: 
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; 
second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through 
the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or 
substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government‘s 
interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and 
administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural 
requirement would entail.
112
 
Due process‘s reach in international matters depends, as we will see, on 
the matter at issue. In American administrative law jurisprudence, it is 
invoked to protect citizens faced with individualized determinations of 
their rights and duties—and much of the sovereignty mismatch problem 
involves rules affecting the many, rather than adjudications affecting the 
few.  
But American rulemaking procedures are meant to meet due process 
requirements, and regulatory globalization does not feature those 
 
 
 111. The pre-deprivation notice and ―some kind of hearing‖ requirements are usually traced to 
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (dealing with the deprivation of government welfare benefits). 
As Henry J. Friendly discusses: 
Since [the Goldberg decision], we have witnessed a due process explosion in which the Court 
has carried the hearing requirement from one new area of government action to another, an 
explosion which gives rise to many questions of major importance to our society. Should the 
executive be placed in a position where it can take no action affecting a citizen without a 
hearing? When a hearing is required, what kind of hearing must it be? Specifically, how 
closely must it conform to the judicial model?  
Henry J. Friendly, “Some Kind of Hearing”, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267, 1268 (1975). 
 112. 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (citing Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 263–71). 
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requirements.
113
 Rather than conforming to some American variant of the 
process required for rulemaking, the international versions are, if anything, 
orthogonal to it—they certainly make no claim that regulatory 
globalization pays any attention to domestic due process concerns, even 
though they clearly act in ways that affect the property rights of American 
citizens, and do so casually and informally regulated industry—the sort of 
industry most affected by regulatory globalization—is afforded the 
protections of the Due Process Clause.
114
 If a process that has been tasked 
to international policymakers affects that industry‘s rights, then due 
process protections apply.  
Moreover, although due process is not a particularly easy claim to win 
in aggregation, it is, as the baseline constitutional guarantee that underlies 
much of domestic administrative procedure, a doctrine that could broadly 
affect almost every instantiation of the sovereignty mismatch problem. 
And yet there has been no effort to reassure Americans that their 
constitutional rights are playing a role in regulatory globalization. 
E. Conclusion 
These legal doctrines underscore a problem with which all variants of 
regulation must contend, but that is often thought to be particularly severe 
in international enterprises—that is the problem of the so-called 
―democratic deficit.‖115 While national institutions are politically 
responsive to the representative institutions of the people, as Peter 
Lindseth has explained: 
 
 
 113. Some language in Vermont Yankee implied that 5 U.S.C. § 553 procedures were sufficient to 
satisfy due process requirements in some informal rulemaking proceedings. Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power 
Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 542 n.16 (1978).  
 114. For example, it is clear that the Fifth Amendment applies to banks. See FDIC v. Mallen, 486 
U.S. 230, 242 (1988) (holding that the Takings Clause applies to banks, although it was not implicated 
by the resolution powers of the FDIC, given the highly regulated nature of the banking industry); Bd. 
of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys. v. DLG Fin. Corp., 29 F.3d 993, 1001–02 (5th Cir. 1994) (using the 
Mallen factors to evaluate the sufficiency of due process in an FDIC takeover). For a discussion of the 
Takings Clause and Due Process implications of the post-crisis government‘s involvement in financial 
regulation, see David Zaring, A Lack of Resolution, 60 EMORY L.J. 97, 131–37 (2010). 
 115. The term is widely used to describe Europe‘s integration problems. See, e.g., J.H.H. Weiler, 
The Transformation of Europe, 100 YALE L.J. 2403, 2472–73 (1991) (describing the democratic 
deficit as an impediment to the consolidation of the European Union); John O. McGinnis & Mark L. 
Movsesian, Commentary, The World Trade Constitution, 114 HARV. L. REV. 511, 564 (2000) (―The 
EU faces an intractable dilemma. It can wield largely unaccountable power from Brussels or make the 
elected European Parliament more politically active. The former option is antidemocratic. The latter 
has the disadvantage of displacing the authority of the democratic processes of individual nations, 
which are more responsive to the preferences and traditions of their respective polities.‖). 
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Institutions exercising supranational normative power . . . exist in an 
. . . attenuated ―two step‖ relationship with the people, or rather the 
―peoples‖ of the various participating states. [But] supranational 
bodies lack the requisite direct connection to the perceived source 
of sovereign power upon which democratic legitimacy is based . . . . 
. . . . 
This persistent need for democratically legitimate, hierarchical-
political oversight and control over administrative decision makers 
points to perhaps the most problematic aspect of supranational 
delegation.
116
 
This two-step problem affects all international institutions, of course, but it 
is particularly severe in regulatory globalization: as the initial delegation 
of power from people to agencies reduces the popular voice (though in the 
same way that national administrative delegations do), the second 
delegation—by agencies through informal interaction with their foreign 
counterparts—only exacerbates the democratic deficit. In both cases, 
political oversight is substantially reduced. Moreover, the way that cross-
border regulation works creates a procedural deficit that contributes to the 
democratic one. 
While charges of insufficient democracy would ordinarily be thought 
of as challenges to the legitimacy of a regime, the democratic deficit 
accusation in regulatory cooperation raises two other issues.  
The first issue is that the regulatory process, sans any responsiveness to 
majority will, is particularly likely to be captured by organized minority 
interests. The problem of regulatory capture of financial oversight, for 
example, is thought to be a substantial one, with charges that the banks 
have captured the government being levied by Simon Johnson and James 
Kwak, among many others.
117
 Similar claims have been made about the 
influence of the energy sector on global warming policy.
118
 
 
 
 116. Peter L. Lindseth, Democratic Legitimacy and the Administrative Character of 
Supranationalism: The Example of the European Community, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 628, 634 (1999) 
(footnote omitted). Elsewhere, Lindseth takes the following crack at the definition of the democratic 
deficit: ―the transfer of normative power to agents that are not electorally responsible in any direct 
sense to the ‗people‘ whose ‗sovereignty‘ . . . the agents are said to exercise.‖ Id. at 633. Of course, the 
term applies to all sorts of international delegations, but it is most widely associated with the European 
Union. For a discussion of the EU‘s democratic deficit by an American constitutional lawyer, see 
Ernest A. Young, Protecting Member State Autonomy in the European Union: Some Cautionary Tales 
from American Federalism, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1612 (2002). 
 117. See SIMON JOHNSON & JAMES KWAK, 13 BANKERS: THE WALL STREET TAKEOVER AND THE 
NEXT FINANCIAL MELTDOWN 13 (2010) (―A central pillar of this reform must be breaking up the 
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Second, regimes which persistently indulge in democratic deficits—or 
at least come to be perceived as such—can find at some point that their 
technocratic accomplishments will be stymied by vociferous, and 
unpredictable, public outcry. The WTO, for example, was unready for the 
criticism and protests that have marked the recent meetings of its 
membership, beginning with the 1999 Battle in Seattle.
119
 Since that public 
rebellion, the WTO has been unable to conclude its latest round of trade 
negotiation talks, the Doha Round.
120
 Placing the blame for the delay 
 
 
megabanks that dominate our financial system and have the ability to hold our entire economy 
hostage.‖). Johnson & Kwak have also argued: 
[S]olutions that depend on smarter, better regulatory supervision and corrective action ignore 
the political constraints on regulation and the political power of the large banks. The idea that 
we can simply regulate large banks more effectively assumes that regulators will have the 
incentive to do so, despite everything we know about regulatory capture and political 
constraints on regulation.  
Id. at 207. For a similar perspective from one of the leading American banking law scholars, see 
Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Dodd-Frank Act: A Flawed and Inadequate Response to the Too-Big-to-
Fail Problem, 89 OR. L. REV. 951, 1011 (2011) (noting that ―analysts have pointed to strong evidence 
of ‗capture‘ of financial regulatory agencies by [large, complex financial institutions (LCFIs)] during 
the two decades leading up to the financial crisis, due to factors such as (1) large political contributions 
made by LCFIs, (2) an intellectual and policy environment favoring deregulation, and (3) a continuous 
interchange of senior personnel between the largest financial institutions and the top echelons of the 
financial regulatory agencies‖). Nobel Prize-winning economist Joseph Stiglitz has evinced sympathy 
for this perspective as well. See, e.g., Joseph Stiglitz, America‟s Socialism for the Rich, GUARDIAN 
(June 12, 2009, 15:00 PM EST), http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2009/jun/12/america-
corporate-banking-welfare (contending that ―[w]e need to break up the too-big-to-fail banks‖). For 
further discussion, see David Zaring, Fateful Bankers, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 303 (2011) (responding to 
Saule T. Omarova, Wall Street as Community of Fate: Toward Financial Industry Self-Regulation, 159 
U. PA. L. REV. 411 (2011)). 
 118. Though one lawyer representing clients in that sector has protested that ―[e]nvironmental and 
energy issues, such as climate change, are heavily debated in the political sphere, so some form of 
lobbying is often necessary and common on both sides of the debate.‖ Tristan L. Duncan, The Past, 
Present, and Future of Climate Change Litigation: How to Successfully Navigate the Changing 
Landscape, in THE LEGAL IMPACT OF CLIMATE CHANGE 12 (Aspatore 2012), available at 2012 WL 
1200512. 
 119. For a discussion, see Clyde Summers, The Battle in Seattle: Free Trade, Labor Rights, and 
Societal Values, 22 U. PA. J. INT‘L ECON. L. 61, 61 (2001) (―On November 30, 1999, representatives 
of 135 countries in the World Trade Organization (‗WTO‘) met in Seattle to agree on an agenda for 
the next round of negotiations. They were greeted by 30,000 to 40,000 protesters, primarily from 
labor, environmental, and human rights organizations who, for a time, blocked their entry into the 
meeting hall. The root of their protest was that the WTO, in developing its rules and procedures for 
promoting free trade, had not given adequate, or any, consideration to labor rights, environmental 
problems, or human rights.‖); and Robert A. Jordan, Battle in Seattle Sent a Message, BOSTON GLOBE, 
Dec. 7, 1999, at D4. 
 120. ―As of March 2010, after nine years of talks, the Doha Round still has no framework 
(modalities) deal, let alone final national schedules.‖ Sungjoon Cho, The Demise of Development in 
the Doha Round Negotiations, 45 TEX. INT‘L L.J. 573, 574 (2010). For a prescient analysis of the 
difficulties in reaching an agreement on the Doha round, see Richard H. Steinberg, Judicial 
Lawmaking at the WTO: Discursive, Constitutional, and Political Constraints, 98 AM. J. INT‘L L. 247, 
256 (2004). For a comparison between the more formal trade system, and the more information-based 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
94 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 91:59 
 
 
 
 
solely at the feet of protestors would oversimplify those dynamics, but the 
difference in WTO talks is notable. The WTO‘s mission to reduce global 
trade barriers has been stymied. The European Union, for its part, has 
found the addition of referenda to its otherwise technocratic and elite-
driven process to be very hard to pass.
121
 The reasons for the delay in both 
lie largely in the perceived undemocraticness of both institutions.
122
 
III. FINANCIAL REGULATION AS A WAY FORWARD? 
The sovereignty mismatch problem is a serious one, but, to the extent 
that it can be solved, one instance of regulatory globalization provides a 
model for its solution: financial regulation. Financial regulation is the 
epitome of regulatory globalization, probably because it was the first 
instance where regulatory globalization prospered. Capital crosses borders 
extremely quickly, and the safety and soundness of financial institutions in 
one country is affected by a loss of confidence in that safety and 
soundness in other countries. Thus, financial regulators have a long 
tradition of cooperation across borders: the regulatory networks in which 
that cooperation has occurred have been around since 1974, making them 
the senior statesmen of the category, and central bankers have been 
collaborating since the beginning of the 20th century, as Liaquat Ahamed 
has shown in his Pulitzer Prize-winning history of that period.
123
 
Financial regulation is unique, but the sort of nested regime that it 
represents, involving domestic and international administrative 
components and institutions, is likely to occur again and again. Nor would 
its like only occur when agencies are negotiating with their foreign 
counterparts. One could argue that even the fraught delegation to the 
 
 
system of financial regulation, see R. Michael Gadbaw, Systemic Regulation of Global Trade and 
Finance: A Tale of Two Systems, 13 J. INT‘L ECON. L. 551 (2010). 
 121. For a discussion of the difficulty, see Renaud Dehousse, The Unmaking of a Constitution: 
Lessons from the European Referenda, 13 CONSTELLATIONS 151 (2006), available at https://www.um 
.edu.mt/__data/assets/pdf_file/0007/40966/dehousse_lessons_from_referenda.pdf. 
 122. See, e.g., Paul B. Stephan, International Governance and American Democracy, 1 CHI. J. 
INT‘L L. 237, 244 (2000) (―Critics of the EU complain of a democracy deficit, labor and environmental 
activists claim that the WTO advances the interests of multinational corporations contrary to the public 
welfare . . . .‖); Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Joel P. Trachtman, Economic Analysis of International Law, 24 
YALE J. INT‘L L. 1, 32 n.117 (1999)(observing that ―some of the concerns over the ‗democracy deficit‘ 
in the WTO, EU, and other international bodies. . . [are because t]hese bodies are increasingly making 
THE sorts of trade-offs that are frequently made by national governments, but many question whether 
these bodies can appropriately make such decisions without greater democratic representation‖); Barry 
Friedman, Valuing Federalism, 82 MINN. L. REV. 317, 392 (1997) (―The impact of international 
treaties like the WTO likely will mirror the democracy deficit emerging as Europe unifies . . . .‖). 
 123. LIAQUAT AHAMED, LORDS OF FINANCE: THE BANKERS WHO BROKE THE WORLD (2009). 
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International Criminal Court Prosecutor might be another example of a 
relatively political international institution (the United Nations) delegating 
a decision to a more legally and technically focused one (the Court and its 
Chief Prosecutor), with the attendant risks to democratic values.
124
 It, and 
other classic examples of public international law may be more 
comparable to regulatory globalization than one might think. 
As described below, financial regulators have (1) institutionalized the 
structure for political oversight of international regulatory cooperation, 
(2) offered administrative process protections to go along with its 
policymaking initiatives, and (3) least satisfyingly, made these steps in a 
context that compares pretty well to its unfortunately low-performing 
domestic variant. The inconsistencies between the global and the local in 
financial regulation are less severe than they might otherwise seem for two 
reasons. One reason is based on the voluntary but real procedural 
regularity of the international process. The other is based on domestic 
financial regulators‘ not-so-punctilious observance of administrative law. 
This is a start, but there is much more that can be done. In the final Part 
of this Article, I will show how to improve on the start made by finance.  
A. Reorganization and Proceduralization 
First, financial regulation is turning into a recognizable regime with 
political oversight at the top, a watchdog in the middle, and policymaking 
(that nonetheless offer some procedural protections) by expert networks at 
the bottom. In this way—with political leadership, middle management, 
and bottom-rung rule-writers—the whole process has taken on a functional 
resemblance, if a disaggregated one, to a domestic agency.  
As for political oversight at the top, the governance point of the G20‘s 
new role in global financial regulation is that it provides a political check 
on the operations of the bureaucrats pursuing international cooperation. 
While the democratic deficit problems faced in international financial 
regulation are real ones, the oversight arranged by the political leaders of 
the member countries whose agencies are ginning up the regulatory 
process is, of course, nothing less than a political endorsement of the effort 
 
 
 124. See Theodor Meron, International Criminalization of Internal Atrocities, 89 AM. J. INT‘L L. 
554, 555 (1995) (observing that ―[t]he enforcement of international humanitarian law cannot depend 
on international tribunals alone‖); see generally Leila Nadya Sadat & S. Richard Carden, The New 
International Criminal Court: An Uneasy Revolution, 88 GEO. L.J. 381, 389, 403–21 (2000) (a 
reference work discerning ―general principles underlying the jurisdiction of the Court, the effectuation 
and expression of the complementarity principle in the Court‘s Statute, and the manner in which cases 
will come to the Court and be decided‖). 
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to create global rules. Though the G20‘s imprimatur does not eliminate the 
inherent two-step process of global rulemaking that Lindseth has identified 
and critiqued, it does offer a global, entirely political, and mostly 
democratically elected leadership review of international financial 
regulation (Russia and China are exceptions, and there is no question that 
the G20 institution, a modern day Concert of Europe, has opaque 
membership criteria).
125
 
As for the watchdog in the middle, the G20 also created the Financial 
Stability Board (FSB), a network of networks that coordinates and 
encourages the work of the networks under it and is meant to also serve as 
an early warning system for financial instability.
126
  
And as for policymaking at the bottom, the reinvigorated, remodeled, 
and expanded Basel Committee on Banking Supervision has been charged 
with promulgating the most significant and onerous (for banks, at least) 
reforms of the financial system in the wake of the crisis.
127
 The Basel 
Committee is the leading version of the formerly siloed regulatory 
networks; its relationship with its new overseers, and its redoubled efforts, 
 
 
 125. See supra note 116 and accompanying text. Verdier is skeptical of the likelihood that the G20 
can constitute such an organized check. Pierre-Hugues Verdier, Mutual Recognition in International 
Finance, 52 HARV. INT‘L L.J. 55, 61 n.16 (2011) (―[D]espite the substantial demand for stronger 
regulation generated by the financial crisis and the G-20‘s political coordination efforts, major 
differences are emerging between the United States and Europe on many of the issues covered by the 
G-20/Financial Stability Board effort.‖).  
   Other scholars, notably Claire Kelly and Sungjoon Cho, are more optimistic about the G20‘s 
political possibilities. See Sungjoon Cho & Claire R. Kelly, Promises and Perils of New Global 
Governance: A Case of the G20, 12 CHI. J. INT‘L L. 491 (2012); see also David Zaring, International 
Institutional Performance in Crisis, 10 CHI. J. INT‘L L. 475, 485 (2010) (―The international 
governance mechanism that appears to be making policy is the G20, and such policymaking is the 
opposite of international law. The G20 is better understood as a Concert of Europe for a new era. Like 
the Concert, it embodies the classic international relations paradigm of heads of state making 
international policy for their subjects . . . .‖). 
 126. See generally FINANCIAL STABILITY BOARD, http://www.financialstabilityboard.org (last 
visited Oct. 9, 2013). ―The FSB should collaborate with the IMF to provide early warning of 
macroeconomic and financial risks and the actions needed to address them.‖ G-20, LONDON SUMMIT: 
LEADERS‘ STATEMENT ¶ 15 (Apr. 2, 2009), available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/ 
2009/pdf/g20_040209.pdf. For a discussion of the FSB‘s burgeoning relationship with the IMF, see 
Enrique R. Carrasco, The Global Financial Crisis and the Financial Stability Forum: The Awakening 
and Transformation of an International Body, 19 TRANSNAT‘L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 203, 220 
(2010) (concluding that ―[o]ne thing is certain: the FSB‘s legitimacy will depend significantly on 
whether the Early Warning Exercises performed in conjunction with the IMF have real substance and 
utility‖); Mario Giovanoli, The Reform of the International Financial Architecture After the Global 
Crisis, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT‘L L. & POL. 81, 108–09 (2009) (―The IMF has not only assumed the tasks 
relating to the overall surveillance of the global financial system and to the assessment of the 
implementation of international financial standards by individual countries, but also participates in the 
elaboration of [international financial standards] through its membership in the FSB.‖). 
 127. See generally BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BIS.ORG, http://www.bis.org/ 
bcbs/ (last visited May 8, 2013). 
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exemplify how those other financial regulatory networks (including 
IOSCO, IAIS, and others) have been given new kinds of marching orders. 
Second, financial regulators have offered administrative process 
protections to go along with their new policymaking role. As it turns out, 
international financial regulation contains more procedural regularity than 
those searching for a more purely political process might expect. The 
Basel Committee, for example, an extremely powerful bank regulator,
128
 
ventilates its rules through comment,
129
 provides information about its 
plans on its website,
130
 and, even if it does not make its meetings open and 
is not subject to any open information requirements (as there is no 
international cognate to the freedom of information acts that allow citizens 
to monitor the domestic bureaucracy), it is an institution that has adopted 
many of the trappings of a regular administrative agency and more of a 
commitment to openness than is required by its own governing documents.  
For example, Basel appears to have taken note of comments. In its July 
2011 Disclosure Requirements on Remuneration by Regulated Financial 
Institutions,
131
 it noted that it had made a consultative version of the rule 
available in December 2010 and that ―[t]he comments received during the 
 
 
 128. No less a financier than Jamie Dimon, the CEO and Chairman of JPMorgan Chase & Co., 
has accused it of trying to ruin American financial competitiveness. Dimon told the FINANCIAL TIMES 
that the proposed Basel III ―capital rules are ‗anti-American‘ and the US should consider pulling out of 
the Basel group of global regulators. . . . ‗I‘m very close to thinking the United States shouldn‘t be in 
Basel any more,‘‖ he told the newspaper. Tom Braithwaite & Patrick Jenkins, JP Morgan Chief Says 
Bank Rules „Anti-US‟, FIN. TIMES (London) (Sept. 12, 2011, 12:01 AM), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/ 
905aeb88-dc50-11e0-8654-00144feabdc0.html.  
 129. David Zaring, Three Challenges for Regulatory Networks, 43 INT‘L LAW. 211, 212 (2009) 
(for example, Basel II ―was put through most of a decade‘s worth of comment by hundreds of 
interested individuals and institutions and resulted in a correspondingly long and detailed regulatory 
product‖). But see Michael S. Barr & Geoffrey P. Miller, Global Administrative Law: The View from 
Basel, 17 EUR. J. INT‘L L. 15, 26 (2006) (―[B]y posting comments on its website, the Basel Committee 
made it easier for the public to assess whether the Committee was being responsive to the concerns 
expressed by commentators. Most participants, however, were large financial institutions. The role of 
the broader public was relatively muted, which reflected in part the technical nature of the Basel 
Committee‘s work and the fact that for most public-interested organizations, the connection between 
banking standards and broader social concerns was not pronounced.‖). 
 130. The proposed rules may be found at http://www.bis.org/bcbs/. As one observer has put it, 
―[a]lthough the Committee‘s decision making has traditionally been secretive and substantially relied 
on personal contacts, it has become more formalized in recent years because of the considerable 
attention given to the deliberations over Basel II.‖ Kern Alexander, Global Financial Standard Setting, 
the G10 Committees, and International Economic Law, 34 BROOK. J. INT‘L L. 861, 871 (2009). This 
responsiveness view is not shared by all, however. See, e.g., Caroline Bradley, Consultation and 
Legitimacy in Transnational Standard-Setting, 20 MINN. J. INT‘L L. 480, 504–05 (2011) (―[T]he Basel 
Committee does not go out of its way to make it easy for commenters to make their views known. . . . 
The Basel Committee also has not typically recognized comments in its final articulations of 
standards.‖). 
 131. Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Pillar 3 Disclosure Requirements for 
Remuneration, ISBN 92-9131- 873-6 (July 2011), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs197.pdf. 
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process helped inform the final version of these requirements.‖132 A simple 
comparison of the two documents reveals that changes were indeed 
made—213 changes, included occasions where the text was moved, 101 
deletions, and 102 corresponding insertions—many of which were minor 
date changes, to be sure, but some of which made a degree of 
difference.
133
 
In short, international comment is a real, if voluntary, phenomenon. 
Since the financial crisis the Basel Committee has opened no less than 
seventeen of its rules to public comment, and while the rulemaking 
process, from proposal to final rule, does not vary greatly, it usually does 
vary to some degree. One way to track the responsiveness is to use 
plagiarism detection software to compare the Committee‘s proposed rules 
to its final promulgations.
134
 As it turns out, the final rule uses, on average, 
only eighty percent of the text of the domestic rule, suggesting that there is 
at least some variability to the comments, as FIGURE 1 depicts.
135
   
 
 
 132. Press Release, Bank for International Settlements, Pillar 3 Disclosure Requirements on 
Remuneration Issued by the Basel Committee (July 1, 2011), available at http://www.bis.org/press/ 
p110701.htm (―The comments received during that process helped inform the final version of these 
requirements.‖). 
 133.  I used the plagiarism software package WCopyfind to compare the proposed rules to the 
final ones. See WCopyfind Software and Instructions, THE PLAGIARISM RESOURCE SITE (2013), 
http://www.plagiarism.bloomfieldmedia.com/z-wordpress/software/wcopyfind.WCopyfind was created 
at the University of Virginia and has recently been used in empirical legal research. See, e.g., Pamela 
C. Corley, The Supreme Court and Opinion Content: The Influence of Parties‟ Briefs, 61 POL. RES. Q. 
468, 471 (2008) (discerning which factors affect the extent to which parties‘ briefs influence the 
content of Supreme Court opinions). For a discussion of WCopyfind, and its application in a different, 
although internationally inflected, rulemaking process, see David Zaring, CFIUS As a Congressional 
Notification Service, 83 S. CAL. L. REV. 81, 114 (2009). 
 134. See Zaring, supra note 133, at 114. 
 135. To be sure, this average is weighed down by a single rule that added an appendix to the final 
rule. Nonetheless, as Figure 1 suggests, most rules did vary from proposal to final version, and in most 
cases, somewhere between 10 and 20 percent of the text changed. 
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FIGURE 1 
 
These comments come from a variety of sources, but domestic 
financial industry trade associations and global financial institutions have 
offered the vast majority of them. As bank associations submitted 57, and 
banks submitted 52, of the 147 total comments to the Basel Committee 
from 2009 to 2011, these groups accounted for a full seventy-four percent 
of the comments received. The British and Japanese banking associations 
were the most prolific commenters, weighing in on five of the 
Committee‘s first seventeen invitations to comment. The French, 
Canadian, and Australian banking associations followed with four 
comments each. The banking associations of Germany, Italy, Hong Kong, 
and numerous other countries also weighed in (the American Bankers 
Association is a notable exception, at least so far). Global banks like 
Barclays, Normura, BNY Mellon, and Credit Suisse also weighed in on 
occasion.
136
 
Most notably, regulators and stock exchanges (which often perform a 
quasi-regulatory function) submitted few comments to the rulemaking 
process. Likewise, civil society has been less involved. While a trade 
 
 
 136. Data on file with the Washington University Law Review. 
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union association and the University of Reading filed one comment each, 
and regulators outside the committee filed a total of three comments 
between 2009 and 2011, the comment process is clearly dominated by 
regulated industry. Overall, these numbers suggest that financial 
institutions take the Basel process seriously, and, somewhat alarmingly, 
comprise the majority of the voice afforded to Committee outsiders.  
COMMENTS FILED WITH BASEL COMMITTEE 2009–2011 
 
Source: www.bis.org/bcbs 
As a matter of domestic administrative law, it is irrelevant that the 
Basel Committee has adopted recognizable administrative procedures. The 
question would be whether the federal agencies subject to the constraints 
of the APA have met those constraints, not whether an international body 
did so. But nonetheless, it surely matters that the fait accompli problem is 
easy to exaggerate, given that regulated industry has influence on the 
international level.  
B. Domestic Financial Regulation‟s Deficiencies 
American financial regulators, for better or worse, are not typical 
domestic administrative agencies, and have never hewed to a strong form 
of domestic procedural requirements.
137
 And if international financial 
 
 
 137. For example, as I have argued elsewhere:  
In crises, [The Treasury Department] acts quickly, and—although not unconstrained by law—
interprets its legal authority flexibly and aggressively. In ordinary times, it acts in exactly the 
same way. It develops policy and makes rules without much attention to the Administrative 
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regulation no longer resembles the ―smoke-filled room‖ of procedureless 
international arrangement, it is worth noting that the agencies that 
implement international financial rules—particularly the Treasury 
Department and the Federal Reserve—are not constrained in the way that 
classic administrative law would ordinarily prescribe.
138
 This is not a 
model, but a cautionary story suggesting that perspective is important in 
thinking through the sovereignty mismatch problem.  
Sometimes the alternatives to global regulation are no panacea. 
Andrew Moravcsik, in defending EU integration despite its democratic 
deficit, has pushed the ―compared to what?‖ question to the fore of debates 
about pan-European legitimacy.
139
 The same question is relevant in 
evaluating the appropriateness of any international regulatory endeavor. Its 
domestic alternative, if it is even viable, may, as it turns out, not be a 
compelling exercise in democratic legitimacy. 
Perhaps the domestic limitations on financial regulation are 
exemplified by the fact that the agencies are rarely seen in court, the sine 
qua non of agency supervision, at least under the American model. For 
example, ―Treasury has marched to the beat of its own drum‖ for a very 
long time, and it is rarely seen in the D.C. Circuit.
140
 It issues few rules for 
 
 
Procedure Act (APA). Treasury has created for itself an ambit of discretion beyond the reach 
of the judiciary, and only somewhat within the bounds of congressional oversight.  
David Zaring, Administration by Treasury, 95 MINN. L. REV. 187, 190 (2010) (foonotes omitted). 
 138. See id. 
 139. Moravcsik‘s argument on behalf of the legitimacy of the European Union is premised on a 
comparison not between the EU‘s mechanisms and some ideal form of democracy, but between the 
EU‘s mechanisms and the forms of public participation and democratic legitimacy of administrative 
processes that we accept as democratically legitimate (such as the regulatory processes within each 
state). Andrew Moravcsik, In Defence of the „Democratic Deficit‟: Reassessing Legitimacy in the 
European Union, 40 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 603, 606 (2002) (arguing, among other things, that the 
EU ―simply specializ[es] in those functions of modern democratic governance that tend to involve less 
direct political participation‖). For a recent discussion of Moravcsik‘s arguments, see David 
Schleicher, What If Europe Held an Election and No One Cared?, 52 HARV. INT‘L L.J. 109, 134–35 
(2011). Grant and Keohane have observed that given that every form of international governance is 
plagued with representation problems, second-best outcomes are the only ones that can be realistically 
expected, though the challenges for international governance are grave. Ruth W. Grant & Robert O. 
Keohane, Accountability and Abuses of Power in World Politics, 99 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 29, 30 (2005). 
For a legal scholar‘s take on that viewpoint, see Esty, supra note 26, at 1537 (―[T]he issues identified 
are not insuperable, particularly if one sees the global administrative law project as aimed not at full-
fledged democratic legitimacy but, more modestly, at better functioning supranational global 
governance bodies with improved legitimacy.‖). 
 140. Zaring, supra note 137, at 190. At least, as compared to other agencies. As I have observed 
elsewhere:  
Between 1998 and 2008 the SEC was a party to fifty-five cases in the D.C. Circuit; the EPA 
was a party to 199 cases in the D.C. Circuit; and the Department of Transportation was a 
party to thirty-five such cases. In contrast, Treasury was a party to only fourteen cases during 
that decade, twenty-five percent the level of the SEC, and seven percent the EPA number.  
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an agency of its size, and it generally has conducted administration in a 
way that reflects its longstanding practices and relative insulation from 
bureaucratization. And the dramatic actions of the Fed during the financial 
crisis, none of which were subject to notice, comment, or judicial review, 
revealed just how far the central bank has strayed from the conventional 
procedures of an APA-mindful domestic agency. 
Instead, both institutions have developed their own way of doing 
things—ways that long preceded the 1946 promulgation of the 
Administrative Procedure Act. The Treasury Department was one of the 
four original departments in the executive branch, and so can trace its 
founding back to 1789, while the Fed was founded in 1913.
141
 This 
historical uniqueness has been exacerbated by internal cultures that simply 
presume that each agency‘s financial regulation is not the sort of thing to 
be second-guessed by courts (the SEC is an admittedly different story).
142
  
C. Sort of Solving Delegation 
The prospect of an international nondelegation doctrine is likely to 
enjoy no more success than the domestic one, given that the United States 
will simply have no choice but to address global problems on a global 
basis.
143
 Many of the problems of delegation can, and probably have thus 
far, been ameliorated by the right sort of domestic follow-on action.
144
 The 
 
 
Id. at 201 (footnotes omitted). 
 141. See History of the Treasury, TREASURY.GOV (Dec. 1, 2010, 12:13 AM), http://www.treasury 
.gov/about/history/Pages/edu_history_brochure.aspx; History of the Federal Reserve, http://www 
.federalreserveeducation.org/about-the-fed/history/ (last visited Oct. 12, 2013). 
 142. Zaring, supra note 137, at 190 (―[T]he interesting thing about Treasury is that it . . . interprets 
its legal authority flexibly and aggressively . . . . Treasury has created for itself an ambit of discretion 
beyond the reach of the judiciary, and only somewhat within the bounds of congressional oversight.‖); 
Simon Johnson, The Quiet Coup, THE ATLANTIC, May 2009, at 46, 52–53, available at http://www 
.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2009/05/the-quiet-coup/7364/ (arguing that banks captured the 
policymaking process during the financial crisis and that the Treasury Department and Federal Reserve 
engaged in ―late-night, backroom dealing‖). 
 143. Lori Fisler Damrosch has suggested that this sort of practical inevitability is, well, inevitable:  
If the administration . . . advanc[es] . . . an ―international nondelegation doctrine‖ in respect 
of the [Persistant Organic Pollutants] Convention, such a position might counterproductively 
disable the United States from exerting influence in international arenas. As the insights from 
comparative constitutional law suggest, constitutionalism and internationalism are not 
contradictory choices. 
Lori Fisler Damrosch, Treaties and International Regulation, 98 AM. SOC‘Y INT‘L L. PROC. 349, 351 
(2004). 
 144. Or so Kristina Daugirdas has argued. ―[T]he legislation implementing regulatory treaties 
comports with the separation of powers: by passing such legislation, Congress neither aggrandizes its 
own authority nor encroaches on executive authority.‖ Kristina Daugirdas, International Delegations 
and Administrative Law, 66 MD. L. REV. 707, 712 (2007). 
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nondelegation doctrine at any rate is one of those doctrines that is easier to 
invoke than to apply. Indeed, many domestic administrative law scholars 
think that the doctrine is dead—it was last invoked by the Supreme Court 
to invalidate agency action in 1935—and that only the political process 
limits the ability or the willingness of Congress to delegate broad swaths 
of rulemaking authority to someone else.
145
  
Congress has tried to remedy the subdelegation problem in the Dodd-
Frank Act. Section 175(a) of the Act allows the President or his designates 
to ―coordinate through all available international policy channels, similar 
policies as those found in United States law relating to limiting the scope, 
nature, size, scale, concentration, and interconnectedness of financial 
companies, in order to protect financial stability and the global 
economy.‖146 Section 175(b) of the Act requires the Chairperson of the 
Financial Stability Oversight Council to ―regularly consult with the 
financial regulatory entities and other appropriate organizations of foreign 
governments or international organizations on matters relating to systemic 
risk to the international financial system.‖147 Section 175(c) requires that 
the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and the Secretary 
of the Treasury ―consult with their foreign counterparts and through 
appropriate multilateral organizations to encourage comprehensive and 
robust prudential supervision and regulation for all highly leveraged and 
interconnected financial companies.‖148 
The SEC and the CFTC are similarly granted authorization to engage 
in international cooperation. Along with the prudential regulators, they  
 
 
 145. See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 
132–33 (1980) (describing the doctrine as dead, but hoping and urging its renewal). But see Cass R. 
Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 315 (2000) (―Reports of the death of the 
nondelegation doctrine have been greatly exaggerated.‖). Indeed, the vibrancy of the doctrine is even 
more attenuated, at least as a matter of court vindication. The Supreme Court has struck down a statute 
on nondelegation grounds only twice, both times in 1935. See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. 
United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935). Moreover, a court 
of appeals has only done so once, only to be quickly vacated by the Supreme Court, which upheld the 
delegating statute. See South Dakota v. U.S. Dep‘t of Interior, 69 F.3d 878 (8th Cir. 1995), vacated, 
519 U.S. 919 (1996); South Dakota v. U.S. Dep‘t of Interior, 423 F.3d 790 (8th Cir. 2005). 
 146. Dodd-Frank Act § 175(a), 12 U.S.C. § 5373(a). 
 147. Dodd-Frank Act § 175(b), 12 U.S.C. § 5373(b). 
 148. Dodd-Frank Act § 175(c), 12 U.S.C. § 5373(c). For a discussion see Eric C. Chaffee, The 
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act: A Failed Vision for Increasing 
Consumer Protection and Heightening Corporate Responsibility in International Financial 
Transactions, 60 AM. U. L. REV. 1431, 1450 (2011) (reasoning that ―[a]lthough the mandates of 
section 175 are vague, Congress‘s acknowledgement of the need for international coordination is 
admirable‖). 
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shall consult and coordinate with foreign regulatory authorities on 
the establishment of consistent international standards with respect 
to the regulation (including fees) of swaps, security-based swaps, 
swap entities, and security-based swap entities and may agree to 
such information-sharing arrangements as may be deemed to be 
necessary or appropriate in the public interest.
149
 
This legislation is explicable only as an effort to get around the 
problem of subdelegation. It is useful stuff, but it is quite narrow. While 
the Secretary of the Treasury appears to be empowered to do a great deal 
of international coordination on bank-shrinking plans, it is not clear 
whether this would reach some of the other, more creative efforts of the 
international networks—for example, scrutinizing executive compensation 
at financial intermediaries. The other authorizations tend to the 
consultation, which is not a delegation of rulemaking power at all. As we 
shall see, it would be better for Congress to more broadly and definitively 
authorize international cooperation going forward. 
Nonetheless, the subdelegation problem is one that, while very live for 
the agencies, is going to be a difficult road to hoe for plaintiffs worried 
about such delegations (if they can even meet the serious hurdles of 
standing and ripeness,
150
 which will always be an issue in these sorts of 
cases). It is the subdelegation issues that present perhaps the most 
complicated ones for the regulatory networks as they proceed. 
D. Appointments and Due Process 
Finance, like other efforts at regulatory globalization, has quietly 
ignored the Appointments Clause problems posed by sovereignty 
mismatch on the theory that courts would not dare to make it a principal 
issue. After all, plenty of international officials wield a great deal of 
potential power over the American government—the members of the 
WTO Appellate Body come to mind
151—and they have never been 
brought to court for Appointments Clause improprieties. Indeed, if the 
Appointments Clause really did require presidential nomination and 
 
 
 149. Dodd-Frank Act § 752(a), 15 U.S.C. § 8325(a). 
 150.  For a discussion of standing and ripeness, which limit the power of courts to hear lawsuits 
(standing limits the class of plaintiffs to those who have suffered a particularized injury caused by the 
government‘s action—in this case, the international action; ripeness limits the ability of courts to hear 
lawsuits against the government before enforcement of the rule), see RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ET AL., 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS 146–69, 208–21 (5th ed. 2009). 
 151. See supra notes 119, 122 and accompanying text. 
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Senate confirmation of all international officials that might, in some 
capacity, be supervising the work of senior American officials, 
international cooperation would be impossible. Other countries surely 
would not agree to such an arrangement, and so making the Appointments 
Clause a barrier to the entry into substantial foreign commitment, enforced 
by either tribunals or secretariats, would essentially freeze the United 
Sates in an environment where international agreement would be totally 
impossible.  
Moreover, the problems of due process are easy to overstate, given that 
the Basel Committee is engaged in making generally applicable rules, 
while due process, at least in its American variant, requires procedures 
over and above rulemaking only when ―[a] relatively small number of 
persons was concerned, who were exceptionally affected, in each case 
upon individual grounds . . . .‖152 Fairness in broad rulemaking is generally 
left to the political process, meaning that, as William Funk and Richard 
Seamon have put it, ―due process is required when the proceeding is 
functionally an adjudication, as opposed to rulemaking.‖153 It might be 
possible to argue that American courts should look to protect the due 
process institutions of financial institutions and those invested in them 
because there is no global democratic political process that can protect 
these individuals. But few observers believe that banks do not exert some 
influence on global financial regulation; if anything, the worry is that they 
exert too much of it.
154
 And as no American court has yet granted a due 
process claim over a rulemaking process, it would be, at the very least, fair 
to say that such a claim would be speculative. 
E. Finance‟s Unique Features 
Finance, in short, begins to solve the sovereignty mismatch problem, 
but it cannot offer a simple template for the resolution of all of the 
 
 
 152. Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441, 446 (1915). 
 153. WILLIAM F. FUNK & RICHARD H. SEAMON, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW EXAMPLES & 
EXPLANATIONS 111 (4th ed. 2011). 
 154. For examples of such views, see JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 117 (arguing, at times 
shrilly, that the financial industry has captured the regulatory process); Adam J. Levitin, Hydraulic 
Regulation: Regulating Credit Markets Upstream, 26 YALE J. ON REG. 143, 159 (2009) (―[R]egulatory 
capture has manifested itself in a novel way in financial-services regulation: regulators who cater to 
financial institutions‘ concerns by promising lax regulation can benefit personally through career 
promotions.‖); Sanjai Bhagat & Roberta Romano, Event Studies and the Law: Part II: Empirical 
Studies of Corporate Law, 4 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 380, 410 (2002) (reviewing the financial regulation 
literature to see ―whether regulation should be interpreted as serving the public interest, or understood 
as benefitting the interests of the regulated or a subset of the regulated‖). 
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problems of regulatory globalization. It is too imperfect and too unique to 
play such a role. There are three ways in which the functional relationship 
between the domestic and the international alleviates rather than 
exacerbates the problems posed by the outsourcing of administrative 
rulemaking.  
First, in both domestic and international financial regulation, politicians 
view finance as something that is mysterious and difficult to oversee, yet 
critical and therefore unamenable to political point-scoring.
155
 In their 
view, finance must be regulated well, for the safety and sake of the 
economy, but it is something that, at least at the granular level, and in the 
fast moving context of a financial crisis, simply is not amenable to 
committee oversight.
156
 It instead must be delegated to technically 
competent officials who operate relatively independently of the political 
supervision.
157
 Financial regulation‘s special place in the administrative 
firmament may be seen in the independence of most modern central banks; 
 
 
 155. This point is, of course, a controversial one, given that many scholars, and many citizens, 
suspect that financial regulation is fraught with politicized rent-seeking. See supra note 116 for an 
account of that case. Nonetheless, the desire to leave financial regulation alone is reflected in the fact 
that it has been vested in independent agencies and the Treasury Department, perhaps the least 
politically constrained of all the departments in the executive branch. See Zaring, supra note 137, at 
190 (observing that ―Treasury has marched to the beat of its own drum since the founding of the 
current administrative state in the aftermath of World War II‖); James B. Watt, Administration Plan 
Would Not Preserve Dual Banking System, 13 NO. 2 BANKING POL‘Y REP. (Prentice Hall L. & Bus.), 
Jan. 17, 1994, at 4, 6 (describing some of the advantages of apolitical oversight). 
 156. See Zaring, supra note 137, at 190 (―In crises, [Treasury] acts quickly, and—although not 
unconstrained by law—interprets its legal authority flexibly and aggressively. In ordinary times, it acts 
in exactly the same way.‖) (footnote omitted). 
 157. Of the independent agencies that oversee finance, the FDIC and Federal Reserve Board are 
self-funded independent agencies, while the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency is a self-funded 
agency within the independent-minded executive branch Department of the Treasury. See, e.g., 12 
U.S.C. § 243 (2006) (authorizing the Fed to set fees for regulated banks to pay for the agency‘s 
expenses); Administrative Law-Agency Design-Dodd-Frank Act Creates the Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau—Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (To Be Codified in 
Scattered Sections of the U.S. Code), 124 HARV. L. REV. 2123, 2127 n.38 (2011) (―Although an 
independent survey identified a number of additional self-funded agencies, such as the Farm Credit 
Administration, Farm Credit System Insurance Corporation, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 
Federal Housing Finance Agency, Federal Reserve System, Federal Prison Industries, Inc., National 
Credit Union Administration, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Bureau of Engraving and 
Printing, and the Office of Thrift Supervision, the list is a short one.‖). 
 The CFTC and SEC are independent agencies, but both depend on congressional appropriations, 
which makes them more subject to political control, for better or worse. Joel Seligman, Self-Funding 
for the Securities and Exchange Commission, 28 NOVA L. REV. 233, 253–58 (2004) (arguing that the 
SEC would be better served by levying fees on regulated industry than it is by relying on federal 
appropriations). More generally, see Lisa Schultz Bressman & Robert B. Thompson, The Future of 
Agency Independence, 63 VAND. L. REV. 599, 611 (2010) (noting that ―[s]everal of the financial 
independent agencies have funding sources, usually from users and industry, which frees them from 
dependence on congressional appropriations and annual budgets developed by the executive branch.‖). 
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an independence that is challenged only by extremists in American 
political discourse.
158
  
Second, the international financial industry itself may be inclined to 
view the prospect of international financial regulation in particular, and the 
regulatory enterprise more generally, as at least somewhat aligned to its 
interests. This in turn minimizes the importance of political, and especially 
judicial, oversight. After all, regulators are charged with ensuring safety 
and soundness of the system, and the managers and owners of banks have 
every interest in ensuring that their own institutions do not go bankrupt.
159
 
Moreover, the financial system is one that both financiers and financial 
supervisors know is prone to bank runs, panics, and tragic herding 
instincts, which means that subpar institutions can put the solvency and 
liquidity of their innocent counterparts at risk.
160
 It is an unavoidable 
consequence of the maturity mismatch that defines what financial 
institutions do. So while regulators seek to ensure that the financial system 
is safe and sound, financial institutions want the same thing; they do not 
wish to be beggared by their neighbors, and effective regulators are better 
positioned to supervise those neighbors than are the financial institutions 
themselves. It is accordingly possible to see how the existence of an 
international administrative process, in a world where Lehman Brothers‘ 
solvency may affect that of Deutsche Bank and UBS, may not be as 
threatening to critical stakeholders as it might appear.  
 
 
 158. Former Texas congressman Ron Paul, for example, has long campaigned to ―end the Fed,‖ 
but is also thought to lie on the outer fringes of the Republican party. RON PAUL, END THE FED 
(2009); David Weigel, The Parallel Universe of Ron Paulistan, GUARDIAN (Sept. 4, 2008, 1:00 PM), 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2008/sep/04/uselections2008.ronpaul (―As Paul has become 
a cult figure, he‘s exerted less influence on the Republican party he wants to change. The party‘s 
platform was written with no virtually [sic] input from Paul‘s energetic activists.‖). 
 159. See Dain C. Donelson & David Zaring, Requiem for a Regulator: The Office of Thrift 
Supervision‟s Performance During the Financial Crisis, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1777 (2011) (discussing 
some implications of capture theory for financial regulators); Levitin, supra note 154, at 156 
(analyzing the alignment of interests between the banking industry and its regulators in the context of 
proposals to make the regulators responsible for consumer protection as well); Binyamin Appelbaum 
& Ellen Nakashima, Regulator Let IndyMac Bank Falsify Report, WASH. POST (Dec. 23, 2008), 
http://articles .washingtonpost.com/2008-12-23/business/36812232_1_darrel-dochow-john-m-reich-
indymac-bank (noting regulators‘ conference calls with bank officials, and describing federal financial 
regulators as behaving more like ―consultants, not cops‖); Henry N. Butler & Jonathan R. Macey, The 
Myth of Competition in the Dual Banking System, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 677, 689–90 (1988) (exploring 
the theory of agency capture by the banking industry). 
 160. See CHARLES P. KINDLEBERGER & ROBERT ALIBER, MANIAS, PANICS, AND CRASHES: A 
HISTORY OF FINANCIAL CRISES 24–37 (5th ed. 2005) (describing the proneness of the financial sector 
to these sorts of problems). Often, these bank runs are countered by system-wide bailouts by the 
government (as was the case in the housing crises of the 1980s and 2008) or the private sector (as was 
the case in the panic of 1907 and the bailout of the Long Term Capital Management hedge fund in 
1998). See id. at 100–02. 
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Third, the procedural limitations of international financial regulation lie 
in policy formulation, but the application of internationally devised policy 
to domestic regulated industry is, at least to some degree, a question of 
enforcement. The distinction matters. Although separating policy 
formulation and enforcement by every jot and tittle would be an 
unproductive exercise,
161
 it is at least worth noting that good governance 
aficionados are particularly worried about the application of the law, rather 
than its development.
162
 Due process considerations enter into the fray at 
the point of enforcement, after all; they classically include the right to a 
hearing, the right to petition, and the like, while the policy formulation 
process presents the possibility of somewhat less stark forfeitures.
163
 For 
example, not even the most punctilious of domestic administrative law 
scholars will deny that there may be some point at which a small number 
of members of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve—say, the 
chair of the board and some of his trusted advisors—meet informally to 
plan their regulatory agenda.
164
 Such policy formulation may not be open 
to outsiders, but if it is followed by the appropriate promulgation of the 
procedure, with sufficient ventilation of the policy scheme for comment 
and critique, then there is little argument with its legality in the end. 
Indeed, many meetings by political officials must be open to the public in 
the American administrative system, but many other such gatherings are 
exempt.
165
 Similarly, the international process is where the policy 
formulation happens while the domestic process is where that formulation 
 
 
 161. For the seminal realist take to this effect, see Shapiro, supra note 80, at 922. 
 162. As Ronald Allen observed, ―[a]s a result of this realization that the police are not simply 
ministerial officers, we have been forced to face some very hard questions that have been ignored until 
recently. The most obvious of these questions is the propriety, both as a legal and as a policy matter, of 
the police exercising discretion in enforcing the criminal law.‖ Ronald J. Allen, The Police and 
Substantive Rulemaking: Reconciling Principle and Expediency, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 62, 63–64 (1976) 
(footnote omitted). 
 163. In some ways this implicates the standard due process difference between the individual 
application of a law and the formulation of a rule that will affect the many. Compare Bi-Metallic Inv. 
Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441, 443–46 (1915) (holding no due process right attached 
to a property tax assessment that was generalized across the citizenry), with Londoner v. Denver, 210 
U.S. 373, 385–86 (1908) (holding due process was implicated by individualized tax assessments). 
 164. Robert B. Ahdieh, The Visible Hand: Coordination Functions of the Regulatory State, 95 
MINN. L. REV. 578, 644 (2010) (describing the ―the financial market‘s close attention to Alan 
Greenspan‘s every word during his tenure as chair of the Federal Reserve Bank, and to the Kremlin-
esque minutes of the Fed‘s Open Market Committee‖); see also ELLYN BOUKUS & JOSHUA V. 
ROSENBERG, FED. RES. BANK N.Y., THE INFORMATION CONTENT OF FOMC MINUTES 1–5 (July 6, 
2006), available at http://ftp.ny.frb.org/research/economists/rosenberg/Boukus_and_Rosenberg_072 
006.pdf (analyzing the content of Greenspan era FOMC meeting transcripts). 
 165. The Government in the Sunshine Act establishes these boundaries. See 5 U.S.C. § 552b(b) 
(―Except as provided in [§ 552b(c)], every portion of every meeting of an agency shall be open to 
public observation.‖). 
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is enforced. Thus, the legitimacy of the domestic formulation may not be 
so onerous.  
So although this paradigm would seem to posit a clash between a 
procedural approach to policymaking and one with no required procedure 
at all, the reality in finance is a compromise which represents a hybrid 
between arbitrary policymaking and routinized, law-governed procedure.  
Perhaps for these reasons, finance is a particularly fertile ground for a 
new paradigm of global regulation—one represented by networks like the 
Basel Committee and networks of networks like the FSB. But although 
that paradigm is usefully applied in international finance, and although 
finance is likely to be a pioneer in global administrative law, it is 
extraordinarily unlikely to be an outlier or a lone example of the new 
public law. Instead, when we see international financial regulation interact 
with domestic administrative law, we can see the future of regulation—not 
just of finance, but of many other areas as well. 
IV. IMPROVING THE SOVEREIGNTY MISMATCH SOLUTION 
Financial regulation has taken some useful steps to deal with the 
sovereignty mismatch problem, but there is more that could be done. One 
step in particular would be attractive: congressional passage of an 
International Administrative Procedure Act that would broadly sanction 
American participation in regulatory globalization (as it must do) but 
condition that participation on familiar procedural protections (as it should 
do).  
But before discussing what such a statute might look like, the 
alternatives to addressing sovereignty mismatch should also be considered. 
Brief reflection shows that they will not be as effective.  
The most straightforward way to add legitimacy, and to constrain some 
of the most vigorous pursuers of regulatory globalization, would be to 
internationally promulgate some principles to which countries agree. For 
example, an International Administrative Procedure Convention could be a 
formal treaty version as to what is expected from international regulatory 
cooperation. If passed, it could bind the countries that ratify it as to the 
processes they offer when engaged in regulatory collaboration, and in this 
manner bind those countries‘ agencies. 
But treaties are hard to promulgate, and the United States may never 
ratify a treaty again.
166
 Perhaps thankfully, however, treaties are not the 
 
 
 166. Other than tax treaties. See Treaty Actions, Department of State of the United States of 
America (Jan. 2012), http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/204054.pdf. For a discussion of 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
110 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 91:59 
 
 
 
 
only way to both create protections and facilitate authorization of 
regulatory globalization.  
The other international alternative is to rely on the regulatory 
globalizers themselves to address the problem. In finance, for example, the 
Financial Stability Board could promulgate procedural standards and best 
practices, which would be followed after G20 endorsement. This approach 
could keep matters completely informal. But, on the other hand, it trusts 
regulators to pass their own constraints on themselves, which is no certain 
guarantee. Those standards would likely be imprecise, and might vary 
wildly by issue area. For these reasons, relying on regulatory globalization 
itself to provide the constraints—and therefore the legitimacy—to 
regulatory globalization is a second best option.  
But this sort of guidance could be provided domestically through 
congressional passage of an International Administrative Procedure Act, 
and, because of America‘s power in regulatory collaboration, could 
guarantee a common international approach. Congress could set forth rules 
about how agencies should collaborate with their counterparts abroad and 
what kind of procedural protections they should bring to the process. One 
can also imagine that Congress could take the opportunity to bless foreign 
cooperation broadly (solving some of the subdelegation problems posed 
by the sovereignty mismatch), or, of course, authorize foreign cooperation 
in a way that limited agency freelancing.  
One way that the congressional authorization could achieve these ends 
would be to insist that regulators go through notice and comment before 
engaging in international negotiations with their counterparts, rather than 
after. Establishing a bargaining range before entering into the international 
agreement avoids the fait accompli problem—that the notice and comment 
process done at the domestic level is a sop offered after the policy has 
been fashioned internationally—and parallels some innovative suggestions 
that Jean Galbraith has made concerning Senate ratification of treaties.
167
 
Or the agencies involved could issue Advanced Notices of Proposed 
Rulemaking (ANPRMs), Federal Register notices not required by the 
APA, but utilized to put regulated industry on notice that regulation is 
 
 
the skepticism with which the Senate has approached treaties recently, and a proposal to facilitate 
authorizing them in the future, see Jean Galbraith, Prospective Advice and Consent, 37 YALE J. INT‘L 
L. 247 (2012). 
 167. Galbraith, supra note 166, at 249, 298 (arguing that the Senate might prospectively consent 
to treaties subsequently negotiated by the executive branch by offering, in addition to ratification, a 
zone of agreement acceptable to the legislative body ex ante). 
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being contemplated.
168
 A series of ANPRMs were issued, in fact, for the 
second iteration of the Basel capital adequacy accords (Basel II).
169
 
One can see some merit to an authorizing statute which clearly states 
that agencies should contemplate collaborating with foreign counterparts 
on global problems, but which also preconditions American commitment 
to precise rules (like Basel‘s capital adequacy accord) on the availability 
of some procedural protections in the international arena. More 
specifically, the statute could require a series of procedures: an 
international comment process, a website, perhaps annual meetings, at 
least part of which are open to the public, and so on.
170
 In sum, if 
American agencies were told by Congress to go forth and collaborate—
with conditions on process—it would be a good way of adding some 
procedural regularity to the process without going to the trouble of 
concluding an international agreement.  
The attractiveness of this congressional solution is based in part on a 
fundamental feature of international regulatory cooperation: the law at 
issue in the sovereignty mismatch problem is not public international law 
(for which a treaty might be attractive), but domestic administrative law 
done across borders. In other words, the phenomenon subject to the 
sovereignty mismatch problem is surely an international one, but the legal 
obligation contained therein is not the same thing as international law. 
Rather, it is better thought of as extraterritorial—and coordinated—
domestic administrative law. 
Nor is an International Administrative Procedure Act something for 
which the time has come and gone. The original Administrative Procedure 
Act, passed in 1946, ratified a number of judicially created procedural 
requirements levied upon agencies, although it also gave those 
 
 
 168. For a paean to the potential of the ANPRM, see Andrew Emery & Fred Emery, Maybe the 
Experts Were Wrong About the ANPRM, 34 ADMIN. & REG. L. NEWS, Winter 2009, at 10. 
 169. See Michael E. Bleier, Operational Risk in Basel II, 8 N.C. BANKING INST. 101 (2004) 
(describing the steps taken in one Basel II ANPRM in some detail). 
 170. This sort of pressure helped to make international institutions like the World Bank more 
accountable. IBRAHIM F.I. SHIHATA, THE WORLD BANK INSPECTION PANEL: IN PRACTICE 4 (2d ed. 
2000) (discussing external criticism, which led the World Bank to create its Inspection Panel process, 
that was ―driven by a broader concern that international organizations were not adequately accountable 
for their activities and by the perception that the Bank, as an important instrument of public policy in 
areas of international concern, needed to be more open and responsive.‖); see also Chi Carmody, 
Beyond the Proposals: Public Participation in International Economic Law, 15 AM. U. INT‘L L. REV. 
1321, 1327–28 (2000) (further discussing accountability in the World Bank); Nico Krisch & Benedict 
Kingsbury, Introduction: Global Governance and Global Administrative Law in the International 
Legal Order, 17 EUR. J. INT‘L L. 1, 4 (2006) (observing the tendency of institutions to create 
administrative procedures). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
112 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 91:59 
 
 
 
 
requirements an agency-friendly, New Deal feel.
171
 In this way, the APA 
took the landscape of domestic administrative law and ratified and 
rationalized it through a single statute.  
A similar process is upon us in the globalization context. We know 
from financial regulation, the most established form of regulatory 
globalization, what kind of procedures agencies and networks may be 
willing to take on and how those networks can perform. Congress‘s use of 
that experience to guide the content of its statutory authorization would 
also help to solve its sub-delegation problem—agencies would have the 
authorization they need to engage in regulatory globalization—as well as 
promote the cause of multi-national solutions to multi-national problems. 
 
 
 171. George B. Shepherd, Fierce Compromise: The Administrative Procedure Act Emerges from 
New Deal Politics, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1557, 1602 (1996) (a leading history of the APA which suggests 
that the bill ―merely codified existing common law‖). For other discussions of the history of the APA, 
see generally Martin Shapiro, APA: Past, Present, Future, 72 VA. L. REV. 447, 452–53 (1986) (―The 
law of the APA is thus largely a congressional affirmation of the scheme worked out by the executive 
branch‘s New Deal lawyers. They formulated a modified and softened version of the prewar vision of 
[Roscoe] Pound and the American Bar Association and fitted it into a basically New Deal plan.‖); 
Walter Gellhorn, The Administrative Procedure Act: The Beginnings, 72 VA. L. REV. 219 (1986) 
(discussing the history of the APA). 
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